740.00112 European War 1939/4670
Memorandum by Mr. David Eccles of the British Embassy
April 20, 1941
Relations Between the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom—20th April, 1941
- 1.
- Anglo-American policy towards France has been vitiated by an overestimation of the French Government’s liberty of action. It was useless to beg, bribe, bully a government to exercise an authority they did not possess. It was equally useless to starve a sick people in the hope that they would crawl back in a still more miserable condition.
- 2.
- The Germans wrote the Armistice as a temporary document in the belief that the bases they were securing would be adequate swiftly to defeat England. This calculation proved wrong. So they are now forced to demand the French Navy and for bases in French North Africa. If Pétain refuses these demands, Hitler will use force. He is preparing to do so.
- 3.
- The Vichy Government does not represent the French people. The Government feels the full force of German pressure which is concealed from the public. Pétain’s bargaining power, always doubtful, is fast disappearing. The overwhelming presence of German troops, the need for food, and the critical position of the French prisoners of war made it impossible for him to resist the demands for economic collaboration. The French Fleet and the French Empire were the only weapons at his disposal.
- 4.
- The Fleet has lost its value as a bargaining counter. It is dependent on the will and ambition of a man who believes Germany must win the war.
- 5.
- The African Empire, less dependent on personal whim, was Pétain’s only card; but the arrival of German troops in Tripoli and German experts in Morocco have destroyed its value. Weygand is no longer capable of carrying out his instructions to defend North Africa against all comers.
- 6.
- This is the present position. Nothing can save Metropolitan France. The Germans are masters there. The Fleet is doubtful. The French African Empire—at least the vital ports of Casablanca and Dakar—can still be saved. All the rest is already lost.
- 7.
- The degree of collaboration which France will concede to Germany is governed by one permanent and one fluctuating factor. First the Germans could occupy the whole of France at any time they wish. Second the belief among the French people that Germany or England will win the war varies with the military situation. Public opinion in France is the only restraint upon the pro-German inclinations of [Page 298] a government—Petain and Weygand excepted—which is convinced Germany will win.
- 8.
- Anglo-American initiative must concentrate its entire effort on North Africa. The French Empire is so tightly controlled by the Vichy Government that independent action by Weygand is not to be expected. The Vichy Government will only at this eleventh hour be moved to accept the consequences of military intervention by England or the United States in North Africa if French public opinion is electrified by the hope that Germany can be defeated. Only direct action by the United States in North Africa will provide this shock.
- 9.
- Economic assistance to Metropolitan France or to French North Africa is no longer adequate inducement to Weygand to resist the German demands. He must invite, or be forced to accept, British or American troops.
- 10.
- If the appraisement of the situation given above is accepted the choice lies between asking Pétain to receive British or American troops and sending an unheralded expedition to seize Casablanca and Dakar. If it is thought that Pétain or Weygand would communicate to Darlan our request to be invited into North Africa then action must be taken without warning. It is possible that Pétain, knowing that his end is near, would have the courage to open the door to our troops before the curtain falls.
David Eccles