740.0011 European War 1939/8818
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
Lord Halifax called to see me this afternoon at his request. The Ambassador gave me an aide-mémoire reading as follows:
“On February 17th the British Consul-General at Tangier79a reported that he had been informed that additional German officers, non-commissioned officers and men had arrived at Casablanca to join the German Armistice Commission which now numbered about 80. This Commission had as terms of reference ‘to control disarmament in Morocco’ and perhaps also in Algeria. The members of the Commission were reported to be specialists in the construction of aerodromes and to be inspecting all airfields in French Morocco. Some of the Commission were also said to be preparing certain isolated spots on the coast of the French Zone of Morocco to serve as supply bases for tankers.
“The Consul-General had been informed that later on the Germans intended to ask Admiral Darlan80 to hand over to them certain Moroccan ports including Casablanca for use as submarine bases.
“The German Armistice Commission had assumed complete control over the French Air Force in Morocco and no machine could fly without first obtaining permission from the Germans who also controlled the supplies of petrol. The British Consul General’s informant expressed the view that the arrival of these additional Germans constituted the beginning of serious German infiltration into French Morocco and perhaps into the whole of French North Africa for the purpose of gradually taking over complete control in all [Page 264] spheres. Furthermore, it was to be anticipated that the recent arrivals would include a certain number of propagandists who would begin to undertake the usual fifth column’ activities.
“The Consul General’s informant thought it likely that the Germans would have acquired control of Morocco and also perhaps of Algeria in less than two months’ time. He suggested that if nothing were done to prevent this, with or without the cooperation of General Weygand, it would be too late.”
I said to the Ambassador that the information thus given me corresponded to a very considerable extent with information which we had received from our own officials in North Africa. I stated that I considered the information disquieting, but that I still believed that economic assistance on our part, provided it were remitted to North Africa in small shipments and its distribution were effectively supervised, would do much to strengthen the position of General Weygand and his associates and would make it easier for them to resist German pressure of this character. I said, however, that in so far as we had any influence in Vichy, it would be exercised to the fullest extent possible with the hope that the French authorities in North Africa would be authorized to take a stronger stand in opposition to a continuation of this constant infiltration.