740.00112 European War 1939/2651
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)
When Mr. Helm called on another matter, I took occasion to mention the fact that we had been rather surprised at the implications of the British Embassy’s note of February 7 to the effect that this Government had gone much further than the British Government in the matter of economic assistance to French North Africa. I said that far from having undertaken advanced negotiations with the Moroccan authorities for trade assistance, without the knowledge of the British, we had actually been behind the British in the various conversations they had earlier undertaken, especially those initiated by Mr. Eccles,75 in Madrid and Tangier. I said I thought it would be desirable to set the record straight in this particular.
Mr. Helm replied that the statements made in the British Embassy’s note of February 7 were based on impressions he had received in the conversation with Mr. Berle on January 28. On that date Mr. Helm [Page 256] had presented the first reply of the British Government to our request for a declaration of its policy in respect to trade with North Africa. Mr. Helm said that in discussing the subject with Mr. Berle, he had received the distinct impression that our proposed policy of opening trade negotiations had already been given full effect and that arrangements with the Moroccan authorities were already well advanced.
As an example of the impression he had received from Mr. Berle, Mr. Helm said that he had understood arrangements for the installation of American trade control officials in Morocco had already been proposed and discussed with the authorities. Mr. Helm said that he had asked Mr. Berle whether these arrangements for American control officials would apply in the case of all imports into Morocco, or only in the case of imports from the United States. Mr. Berle had replied that he was unable to give an answer as to the extent of American control at this time.
Mr. Helm said that he had, frankly, been shocked and surprised at the extent to which he inferred the American discussions had gone, and that when it became time to draft the Embassy’s note of February 7, the impressions he had received from Mr. Berle had been used as a basis for the statements regarding the British assumption that conversations had been carried on by the United States Government without the knowledge of the British Government. I told Mr. Helm that in my opinion there must have been some misunderstanding of our position. Our action in the matter so far had been limited to preliminary explorations, with particular regard to the obtaining of assurances that any commodities sent to North Africa would be solely for local consumption and would not be reexported. In any case we had taken no steps toward the appointment of the control officials as mentioned by Mr. Helm. I repeated that the negotiations which the British had already undertaken had gone much further than ours. Mr. Helm said that he was sorry if a misunderstanding had occurred.
Discussing the conversations which Mr. Eccles had been carrying on with the French representatives for trade in North Africa, Mr. Helm said no real progress had been made and the conversations were on the verge of breaking down. He said that the reason for this was the fact that the British Government, as a sine qua non for consenting to the proposed trade arrangements, required the surrender to the British Government of the British, Allied and neutral shipping now in North African ports. I asked Mr. Helm whether he thought there was any possibility that the French would do this, or that the German Port Commissioner in Casablanca would give his permission to the proposal. Mr. Helm said that he did not feel there was much chance and that, therefore, there was not much chance of the trade proposals going through. However, the French were being given this [Page 257] opportunity to “thumb their noses” at the Wiesbaden Commission, and if they did not take advantage of it the British could do no more.
In reply to my further questions, Mr. Helm went on to say that he thought it was still a great gamble to attempt to strengthen the French in North Africa. He said there was no way of telling whether a strengthened French force in that area might not attack the British, instead of helping them. A large proportion of the products now going to Marseille, said Mr. Helm, were known to be passing into the hands of the Germans and Italians. If it were possible to stop this trade entirely, the British would do so, but they did not have sufficient naval units to accomplish this. Mr. Helm said that his Government was extremely reluctant to take any chances on restoring the economic system in French Africa and that he personally regarded it as a great risk.
- David Eccles, representative of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare.↩