740.00112 European War 1939/2213
The British Embassy to the Department of State 53
Memorandum
On December 18th Mr. Berle raised with Mr. Helm and Mr. Marris54 the question of Morocco.55 He explained that while the United States Government were anxious to keep in step, they were in considerable doubt regarding the British Moroccan blockade policy. He therefore requested that if possible a clear statement of this policy be obtained from London.
At the conference with Mr. Berle the Embassy representatives expressed the view that it was the intention of His Majesty’s Government to treat Morocco as a separate entity and that their aim was to apply a blockade in principle but at the same time to allow Morocco to obtain certain essential requirements. It was evident that the proposed Anglo-Moroccan barter deal was making slow progress, that the recently signed Spanish-Moroccan agreement was of a minor nature, and unlikely to be treated as a precedent, and that the negotiations over cobalt and molybdenum which might shortly be taking place were probably inspired by the overriding expediency of placing these minerals in safe hands.
[Page 243]Mr. Berle’s request was at once referred to London, and the Embassy have been instructed to express to him the appreciation of His Majesty’s Government of his assurance regarding the attitude of the United States Government. The Ministry of Economic Warfare go on to say that the explanations given to Mr. Berle by the Embassy representatives were correct, and have instructed the Embassy to supplement them with the following further explanations.
A memorandum on the general policy of His Majesty’s Government towards territories controlled by the Vichy Government is being handed separately to Mr. Sumner Welles56 (a copy is attached57). As regards Morocco specifically, the policy of His Majesty’s Government is in principle to prevent Morocco from becoming a channel for enemy imports and exports.
In order to avoid the risk of internal trouble in Morocco, His Majesty’s Government some time ago decided, as the State Department are aware, to allow the Moors to have limited quantities of green tea and sugar if, in exchange, His Majesty’s Government could obtain essential requirements of phosphates and thereby save dollars and the long haul of phosphates from Florida. Apparently owing to German opposition, negotiations in this direction made no progress and the Spanish Government then intervened with a demand for Moorish phosphates which were indispensable to the 1941 harvest in Spain. In the circumstances His Majesty’s Government felt obliged to accord Spain the necessary credits for the purchase of green tea and sugar in the sterling area in part exchange for the phosphates she required.
His Majesty’s Government are now attempting to resume negotiations with Morocco, but on a different basis from the original scheme, since in the meantime they have covered in Florida their original requirements of phosphates. Further supplies of these are urgently required and shipping to carry them cannot be spared from Britain’s existing resources. The Moroccan authorities are debarring British and Allied neutral ships from leaving their ports under the orders of the German Armistice Commission, and the sine qua non of the present negotiations is the release of these ships. It is doubtful whether the Moroccan authorities will be prepared to defy the Germans to this extent. They have, for instance, not yet agreed to send a delegate to Lisbon to meet the British representative there, and His Majesty’s Government are therefore not hopeful about the outcome of the negotiations.
Mr. Berle said he had learnt that ships and goods were passing freely between Morocco and Europe. The Ministry of Economic [Page 244] Warfare agree that this is the case, but explain that this movement is taking place neither with their permission nor with their connivance. They are in fact detaining vessels as and when possible, but naval limitations are such as to render these detentions only too few. The fact is that British naval commitments elsewhere, and particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean, render it impossible for His Majesty’s Government at the present time to carry out their declared policy of maintaining a blockade off the African Coast and in the Straits of Gibraltar. They hoped that the Embassy’s recent approach to the State Department regarding the transhipment of goods at Martinique would enlist the assistance of the United States Government in strengthening the blockade; they attach much importance to this and they earnestly hope that more practical assistance in this direction may be forthcoming.
As has been indicated above, His Majesty’s Government are at present treating Morocco as a separate unit for purposes of the blockade. They point out that the situation in Spain, Algeria and Tunis is different from that in Morocco, and that it would in any case not be possible to stop sailings inside the Mediterranean between Algerian and Tunisian ports and Metropolitan France.
His Majesty’s Government wish to reiterate that they have no intention or desire to discriminate against United States interests or to operate the blockade unfairly. They have asked the Embassy to emphasize to Mr. Berle that no trade has taken place between the United Kingdom and Morocco since the French Armistice, and that any future trade will depend on the outcome of the present negotiations. Without some corresponding sign of goodwill, His Majesty’s Government would not feel justified in negotiating a rationing agreement, and would be reluctant to agree to any imports whatsoever into Morocco. The French population know that they have nothing to fear from a British victory and, if the blockade were to be relaxed unconditionally, would conclude with Latin logic that they had more to gain by maintaining good relations with the Germans than with the British.
Should His Majesty’s Government obtain the release of the ships in Moroccan ports they would propose, at any rate in the first instance, to restrict imports into Morocco to tea and sugar and to small quantities of cotton piece goods. Moroccan exports would be restricted to an equivalent value in goods such as phosphates, which His Majesty’s Government themselves want, and minerals such as cobalt and molybdenum, which are German deficiencies. If it should be absolutely necessary for them to give further concessions in order to obtain these minerals, they might be prepared to allow small quantities of further imports such as coal.
[Page 245]It would be part of any arrangement that the proceeds of agreed exports from Morocco should not accrue to her in free foreign exchange, since the provision of free exchange would not only encourage her to purchase key commodities, but would indirectly be at the disposal of the Vichy Government.
Finally, His Majesty’s Government point out that it would help greatly towards the establishment of a common policy to be carried out in agreement if the United States Government would state what kinds and what amounts of commodities they would like to export to and import from Morocco. For the reasons indicated above His Majesty’s Government trust that it would be understood that in the case of Moroccan exports such commodities would be restricted to essential United States requirements. Moroccan imports from the United States on the other hand would necessarily be for local consumption only, it being understood that the importation into Morocco of key commodities could not be contemplated.
- Handed to Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, by A. K. Helm, First Secretary of the British Embassy, on January 28.↩
- A. D. Marris, First Secretary of the British Embassy.↩
- See memorandum by Henry S. Villard of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, December 18, 1940, Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. ii, p. 632.↩
- Under Secretary of State.↩
- Infra. ↩