740.0011 European War 1939/10928: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 14—10:35 p.m.]
547. I feel that the time has come when I should make clear to the Department that the trend of French policy today is definitely toward greater collaboration, willingly or unwillingly, with Germany and that the Department should not anticipate a reversal of this trend under present conditions; nor should it expect any serious resistance to German demands where such demands are of sufficient importance to the Germans to warrant the exercise of degrees of pressure which are within their power. I am satisfied that at the present time the Marshal will offer no resistance to any German demands short of “voluntary active military aid.”
There are only two possible developments today which could stimulate resistance by the Marshal or by his Government: A British victory in the Middle East, or some definite action (not words) on our part [Page 168] sufficiently important and concrete to convince the French Government of forthcoming active participation by the United States in the war.
Last winter when the British were advancing to Benghazi and beyond and when the progress of our Lease and Lend Bill led to exaggerated hopes in France of the implications of its passage in terms of immediate action, the Marshal’s attitude was noticeably “stronger” and his declarations as to the limits of collaboration beyond which he would not go were more promising than is the case today. The rapidity of the German advance in Libya, the rapidity of the conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece, particularly the overwhelming German air superiority displayed in the latter struggle, and the apparent success of the German air and submarine campaigns in the Atlantic have served almost completely to destroy the hopes which had slowly and gradually been built up over the months since last June that a British victory is possible. Though it has of course immeasurably strengthened their hands, belief in the success of German arms is not confined to the small but influential circle of collaborationists: even the ardent Anglophiles and the simple people of both zones who have such a bitter understanding of what a German victory will mean for France have now largely become so discouraged as to hope only for an early peace and for the liberation of the million and a half prisoners. Accompanying this feeling is a growing belief in the doctrine proclaimed by the Germans and their French collaborationist friends—false as Nazi history shows it to be—that by helping Germany now the terms of peace imposed by the victor will carry proof of their generous and liberal attitude; that a contrary policy by France today will correspondingly render the peace terms imposed that much harsher, and the lot of the people and the prisoners that much more difficult in the interim.
France and the Marshal have, since last June, had but three trump cards of value to play against the Germans; first, the possibility of the Marshal’s resignation; second, the possibility of resumption of war on the British side in North Africa; and third, the possibility of utilization of the French fleet in the British cause. The fact that the Germans have not destroyed the Marshal or his Government seems ample proof of their feeling that his disappearance would increase their difficulties in administering the country and would also increase the danger of riots, sabotage, and other burdens of occupation. Apparently, in German eyes, a Laval government kept in power by German machine-guns would present more difficulties than it is worth and therefore a threat by the Marshal to resign would seem to be clearly one of his trump cards. There did seem to be a possibility during his former attitude last winter that the Marshal, if German demands exceeded either his wishes (such as restoration to power of his detested [Page 169] former associate Laval) or what he considered the limits of honor and dignity such as military aid to Germany, might have resigned. Though he had shown signs of increasing discouragement in recent weeks and clear indications of a growing fatigue with the burdens that he is forced to bear there is a good reason to believe that he would regard such action on his part, whatever measures of force the Germans take, as a betrayal of his people and a violation of his promise printed on so many of his photographs appearing throughout the country: “I make to France the gift of my person.” That he will relinquish more and more authority even on matters of policy to Darlan seems likely; that he will resign and declare his reasons for so doing seems highly improbable.
As to resumption of the war in North Africa the Marshal made his decision on this point last June and there is nothing to indicate that he has for a moment wavered. He has told me on more than one occasion of his ardent desire to keep out of the war and I have no reason to doubt his resolution on this point.
If he has suffered many disillusionments with respect to the methods and promises of his German conquerors, he has never, even last winter, approached the point of military resistance. As the Department will recall, it was the Marshal last June who, with Laval, led the fight against continuance of the war from North Africa. He did so because he felt that the sufferings of the population, both military and civilian, of metropolitan France would be greatly and vainly increased thereby. He still, I am convinced, holds that view. He will not, under conditions prevailing today, with German military fortunes as high as they are, give direct orders to Weygand to resist with force any German attack. Though he is much disturbed and discouraged at the German threats to North Africa and the possibility of the arrival of German troops in the Spanish Zone of Morocco he will not in my opinion either order resistance or tacitly authorize it. From this distance I find it difficult to believe that without such orders Weygand, when the moment comes, will take up the fight—especially now that German armored divisions have arrived in Libya. He cannot of course do so with any hope of success in the absence of planes, tanks and artillery in quantity.
Presumably, with the arrival of Murphy67 in North Africa, the Department will be better able to judge Weygand’s attitude than I can from here.
As to the fleet we may be sure that as long as the Marshal remains and as long as Darlan is in power it will not be employed to help the [Page 170] British. The danger is as it has always been that through the pretext of convoying through the blockade or defense of the colonies its guns will again be turned against France’s former ally. While the Marshal, I believe, will stick to his oft repeated promise that the fleet will not be turned over to Germany they may accomplish the same object by indirect methods: this as we have often stressed is a principal danger.
In conclusion therefore I feel that, while much of the foregoing may be obvious, I should inform the Department that in my opinion the Marshal will not renounce “collaboration”; that he will not reenter the war on the side of the Allies and that the Germans can and may either with or without his authorization either with or without token concessions in return send troops through the unoccupied zone, take control of Mediterranean ports, acquire air or naval bases in Africa or Syria, or accomplish any other objective they seek. The only deterring factor, with British prestige at its present low ebb, is the amount of pressure the Germans wish to exert and the importance to them of their objective. The feelings of the people of France are an important restraint upon what the Marshal or even Darlan might willingly concede. They are not, however, enough to steel him to resistance by force in North Africa or elsewhere against any steps that the Nazis decide to take.
The calling of Admiral Darlan to Berchtesgaden by Hitler is so reminiscent of the Schuschnigg and Hacha incidents68 as to indicate serious complications in the near future.
A definite aggressive radio campaign from America via the B.B.C.—always respecting the person of the Marshal—to inform the friendly people of France as to what our attitude will be in the event of collaboration is indicated as immediately necessary.
- Robert D. Murphy, Counselor of Embassy in France, assigned to special duty in North Africa.↩
- Presumably reference is to Austrian Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg’s visit with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on February 12, 1938, at which time Schuschnigg was forced to admit Nazis into his government, and to the summoning of President Emil Hacha of Czechoslovakia by Hitler to Berlin on March 14, 1939, when Hacha placed the fate of the Czech people in the hands of Hitler.↩