851.48/410
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
The French Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his request. The Ambassador commenced the conversation by bringing up again the question of the urgent need of the French people in unoccupied France for food, saying that the situation was becoming disastrous, supplies had reached a low ebb, and actual starvation would soon exist in unoccupied France. The Ambassador expressed the greatest appreciation for the sending today of two Red Cross ships with flour on board, but stated that these supplies would last only about ten days, and that unless the French Government were able to purchase with its own money food for the relief of distress in France, a tragedy would take place the consequences of which no one could foretell.
I said to the Ambassador that it seemed to me that the time had now come for a completely frank statement on my part to the Ambassador. I said that the Ambassador knew very well that this Government, by direction of the President, had undertaken in the most sympathetic spirit to explore the possibilities of assisting Marshal Pétain in relieving distress in unoccupied France by making it possible for children particularly to have sufficient food to keep them in a reasonable state of health. I said that he and I had discussed on various occasions the ways in which this could be carried out with such assurances given to the United States Government as to place this Government in a position where it could feel satisfied that food [Page 149] so supplied to the French civilian population would not be utilized directly or indirectly for the benefit of Germany. I said that these explorations and interchanges of views with the French Government had taken place in the same way and in the same spirit as the discussions relating to North Africa had taken place, and that in the latter regard I was glad to believe that arrangements were now reaching a satisfactory conclusion.
I said, however, that at the very time that this Government was making a sincere and earnest effort to find a satisfactory way towards the alleviation of distress on the part of the civilian population in unoccupied France, and at the very time when Marshal Pétain, in whose honor and patriotism and good faith this Government had complete confidence, was assuring us that his Government would under no conditions do anything which could be of assistance to Germany above and beyond what was called for by a strict interpretation of the clauses of the Armistice Agreement, Admiral Darlan had not only made public declarations of hostility towards Great Britain, but had permitted, or directed, certain measures to be taken by the French authorities which were completely counter to the letter and spirit of the assurances given us by Marshal Pétain. I referred specifically to the shipment of rubber which was unquestionably destined for Germany; to the attempted shipment of 5,000 tons of gasoline from Algiers to Tunisia; and the orders given for the Dunkerque to return to Toulon from North Africa. I said the Ambassador must realize, and realize very clearly, that this Government could not find it possible to continue the discussions which had been commenced for the purpose of supplying food for the civilian population in unoccupied France at a time when the policy of Admiral Darlan could be interpreted only as a policy of intimate cooperation with Germany, and a policy of assistance to Germany which went far beyond anything called for by the terms of the Armistice Agreement.
I stated that if the French Government by act as well as by word carried out the assurances given this Government by Marshal Pétain, I had every reason to believe that a satisfactory solution could be found.
The Ambassador admitted quite frankly that many acts which he termed “incomprehensible” had taken place. He said, however, that the policy of the French Government could only be that laid down by Marshal Pétain as communicated to us. He said that until Marshal Pétain’s government proved that it had departed from this line of conduct, it was not fair for this Government to assume that the “flirtation” between Admiral Darlan and the German authorities indicated that the policy of the French Government was any other than that communicated to us by Marshal Pétain.
[Page 150]I replied that it seemed to me the word “flirtation” was hardly apt. I said that if the Ambassador desired to employ amorous similes it seemed to me that the term “liaison” was far more accurate. I said, furthermore, that the hostility of Admiral Darlan to the British Government and to the British nation was now so open and apparently so violent as to make it impossible for this Government to understand how a man who was animated as Admiral Darlan was, and who had in practice carried out his individual prejudices so frequently, could possibly be regarded as capable of carrying on the policy laid down by Marshal Pétain. I said I was sure that the Ambassador realized from the American press and from prominent Americans with whom he spoke, how very strongly public opinion in this country shared the opinion I myself had expressed to him.
The Ambassador said that this was unquestionably the fact. He asked me what I thought he had better do.
To this I replied that, as the Ambassador knew, I had some time ago suggested to Lord Halifax that a personal and confidential meeting between the two Ambassadors would be helpful from every stand point. I said that I would again speak to Lord Halifax about this possibility and should such a conference be possible of arrangement, I thought that might be the first practical step which might be taken. I said that if as a result of such a conference the British Government felt it could, without prejudicing its own interests, favor continued negotiations between France and the United States for the purpose of supplying food to the civilian population in unoccupied France, this Government of course would be happy to proceed at once in that direction.