851.33/1296/7: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 9—1:56 p.m.]
413. [From Matthews.] Embassy’s telegram 396, April 5, 5 p.m.60 Rochat60a asked me to call this morning and handed me the following note with reference to the transfer of the Dunkerque. He said that he hoped we would find the note satisfactory since it made it clear that the vessel in question would not be moved without prior agreement with us. The text of the note reads as follows:
“By a memorandum handed to Marshal Pétain on April 4th, the American Chargé d’Affaires called attention to a report according to which the French Government ‘authorized’ by the Wiesbaden Armistice Commission was preparing to transfer the Dunkerque from Oran to Toulon, at the very moment when the Government of the United States was expressing its interest in an opposite movement of naval [Page 147] forces. ‘Should such a transfer take place,’ adds the memorandum, ‘the Government of the United States could no longer envisage the continuation of the policy which it desired to pursue for the supplying, as far as possible, of its indispensable aid to unoccupied France, to say nothing of the other acts of cooperation envisaged.’
The Marshal’s Government loyally admits without any embarrassment that it had in fact intended to have the Dunkerque made ready for the transfer to Toulon in the near future. But this measure had been envisaged with full sovereignty, without any foreign pressure whatsoever, and solely for technical reasons.
The Government of the United States is fully aware that the Dunkerque was severely damaged in the month of July 1940 as the result of an odious assault in which numerous Frenchmen were killed.
The ship is today in condition to move; but its final repairs require a stay in drydock, which can only be made in Toulon, the only arsenal of either North Africa or the unoccupied zone able to accommodate it. This is the sole reason why the transfer of the Dunkerque was envisaged and remains necessary.
Nevertheless, in view of the political significance which the Government of the United States seems disposed to attach to this transfer, the French Government agrees to delay the preparation of the ship until the conclusion of an agreement on this subject. It desires thus to show the Federal Government its will to pursue loyally, for its part, as far as its means will permit, the policy undertaken with a view to assuring the supplying of French Africa and the unoccupied zone.
But by postponing putting into final shape one of its most precious war vessels the French Government is making heavy sacrifice of self-respect and interest which affect its possibilities of defending its empire as well as its means of protecting French maritime traffic.
The French Government thus expects the American Government to use its good offices in London in order to obtain from the British Government the guarantee that as long as the Dunkerque will remain in North Africa no further capture will be exercised against our legitimate commercial traffic between the French colonies, French Africa and the unoccupied zone. It is evidence in fact that a country as threatened with famine as France is cannot be asked to renounce the utilization of all its means of defense if the commercial maritime traffic for the protection of which guarantees have been offered continues to be pursued and attacked.”
Leahy