Office of the Historian

851.33/1291/7: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

London, April 2, 1941—6 p.m.
[Received April 2—4:33 p.m.]

1282. Personal for the President from Former Naval Person.

  • “1. We have entirely authentic secret information that Vichy Government have received ‘permission’ from Armistice Commission to [Page 140] transfer battleship Dunkerque, with escort protection of the whole Strasburg group, from Oran to Toulon for ‘disarmament’. Transfer will begin on 4th April.
  • 2. It seems certain that object of transfer is to effect repairs, and we must of course assume it is being done on German orders.
  • 3. I do not need to point out to you the grave danger to which this exposes us. The menace from German surface raiders is already great enough. The addition of such a vessel to the raiding fleet would set us a hard problem indeed. If any value were to be attached to Admiral Darlan’s word, it might be hoped that he would in the last resort order out of French metropolitan ports naval units ready for sea. But if Dunkerque is docked and immobilized for repairs, that gives the Germans time to swoop and gain possession of her.
  • 4. I fear this is a sinister confirmation of our worst suspicions of Darlan.
  • 5. You have already, through your Ambassador in Vichy, indicated to the French Government that negotiations for the supply of grain to unoccupied France would be greatly facilitated if French warships in metropolitan ports were gradually transferred to North African Atlantic ports. Here we have Darlan not merely failing to comply with your wishes, but deliberately flying in the face of them.
  • 6. I earnestly hope that you may at once indicate to Marshal Petain that, if Darlan persists in this action, he will be cutting off relief from his country and finally forfeiting American sympathy. We ourselves in this situation could, of course, lend no assistance to the revictualling of France. There may be just a chance that Marshal Petain may deter him from this action, but if not, the matter for us is so vital that we may, even in spite of all the dangerous implications, have to make an effort to intercept and sink this vessel. I should like to hear from you that you would understand the necessity for such a step.
  • 7. It is, of course, of first importance that neither the French or their masters should guess the source of the information or be made aware that we might take the drastic action mentioned in paragraph 6.”
Winant