740.0011 European War 1939/12955: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:05 p.m.]
1327. The British Ambassador called on me this morning and told me (1) that in his talk with Stalin yesterday the latter had made no attempt to conceal the seriousness of the situation although he expressed confidence in the ultimate defeat of Hitler. Cripps said that Stalin had made it clear that he expects the Germans to occupy considerable additional Soviet territory before it will be possible for the Russian armies to halt them and had explained that the Soviet forces [Page 180] are still suffering from the element of surprise. In consequence, some time must pass before they can bring all their forces to bear and deploy them in the manner they desire.
The Ambassador said that Stalin had proposed a mutual assistance pact between Great Britain and the Soviet Union and an agreement that neither Britain nor the Soviet Union would make a separate peace with Germany. Cripps strongly favors the immediate acceptance of Stalin’s proposal but expressed concern lest certain elements in high British Government circles, by reason of their basic mistrust and dislike for the Soviet Government might avail themselves of the opposition of Spain, Sweden and Turkey to such a pact to bring about its rejection or prolonged negotiations. He said that Stalin had made it obvious that he was willing to cooperate wholeheartedly with Britain after the conclusion of such a pact.
Cripps added that he did not believe that Soviet mistrust of Britain and British mistrust of the Soviet Union could be removed unless there was prompt and wholehearted acceptance of Stalin’s proposal, and said that in his opinion failure to accept it could only result from prejudice in conservative quarters in Britain and might well give Hitler ultimate victory. On the other hand, complete cooperation based on such a pact would give to the Soviet leaders the element of international respect which they desired and make them “entirely manageable” at the peace conference.
2. Cripps then referred to the possibility that Japan might threaten or actually interfere with the shipment of British and American war materials to Vladivostok and said that he thought both the British and American Governments should be prepared immediately to take the firmest possible position at the first sign of such a move inasmuch as he was convinced that it would be a “big bluff” in view of the presence of the American Navy in the Pacific. In his judgment the most dangerous course Britain and the United States could pursue would be to show the slightest vacillation in the face of any interference with the shipment of war materials to Vladivostok. Cripps called my attention to the small amount of Soviet tonnage available for the transportation of material across the Pacific, saying that many of the limited number of ships that were available were in a bad state of repair. He requested me to ask the Department to give consideration to the repair of Soviet vessels in American Pacific yards.
3. Cripps suggested close cooperation between our two Embassies in respect of requests by the Soviet authorities for material aid or assistance52 saying it was important that the Soviets should not duplicate their requests and that there should be no overlapping or [Page 181] confusion. I told him that I would instruct Dickerson53 to keep in close contact with Cadbury54 of the British Economic Mission.
4. The Ambassador evinced considerable optimism concerning the ability of the Soviet armies to prevent the fall of Moscow, expressing the view that it would be a long time before the German forces would be able effectively to threaten this city. I told him I did not share his optimism as in my opinion the seizure of Moscow by the Germans would be decided according to the general strategy of the campaign by the German General Staff rather than by the defensive strength of the Soviet armies.
5. Cripps said he feared that Britain and the United States might approach the Soviet need for materials and munitions from the point of view of giving only available surplus to them rather than making sacrifices of material and munitions assigned to their own programs. He said he thought it was imperative that both Britain and the United States, if they desired the continuance of an eastern front throughout the war, should make genuine sacrifices in order to provide the Soviet forces with material and munitions and not limit their deliveries to surpluses. He said that aside from the element of active cooperation, the Soviets are well informed as to what is and is not available to Britain and the United States and that Soviet confidence in their full cooperation could only be assured by evidence that real sacrifices were being made.
Cripps emphasized the importance of the continuance of an eastern front, expressing the opinion that large German forces could be immobilized at vast distances from their bases if the Soviet Government were enabled to maintain large armies in the field irrespective of their geographical position, adding that the farther east the Germans drove, the worse it would be for them when winter came. In this connection Cripps said that Stalin had told him that the morale of some of the German prisoners was not of the best.
6. Cripps said that the cooperation between the Soviet military authorities and the British Military Mission is by no means complete and that his Mission had been unable as yet to obtain vital information such, for example, as the Soviet reserves, their present disposition, loss in material and existing available number of planes, tanks, etc. He had said to Stalin, however, that he recognized that 20 years of mutual distrust could not be removed in 10 days.