893.102/90½
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
I share Mr. Hamilton’s view62 that no useful purpose would be served by our attempting to make reply to the Chinese Government. I feel, however, that we should give serious consideration to points (1) and (2), and that we should not entirely rule out point (3).
In my opinion, the United States must, no matter what we may do or not do in the field of material pressures, continue to maintain a diplomatic front on the Pacific and in the Far East. I feel that, no matter what we may wish that we might do, it is impossible for us to “abandon” our principles and to scrap our objectives in relation to China, to Japan, to China and Japan, and in relations with other countries in the Far East. The fact that there have been and are hostilities in the Far East has not dissolved-out our interests and concern in and with regard to that region. The fact that there is a war in Europe and that we are menaced by trans-Atlantic developments does not dissolve-out our interests and concern in and with regard to the Far East and the fact that we are menaced by trans-Pacific developments. In the case of the Japanese-Chinese conflict, we have one theater of operations in which broadly speaking the armed conflict has been running in a manner unfavorable to the aggressor side. That China continue to resist Japan will be to the advantage of the United States and Great Britain and France. The United States and Great Britain and France should, therefore, encourage and as far as possible support China’s resistance. These three powers should cling to those of their “special” rights in China the existence of which is now helpful both as regards their own nationals and as regards China while resisting Japan. Also, they should as far as possible keep open channels of communication with China. The Chinese suggestion in those connections is a common-sense suggestion. True, we should at this time speak gently to Japan and we should not give Japanese chauvinists new grounds for argumentation that the Japanese Navy should move toward new conquests, but we need not stand in our tracks as regards diplomatic pursuit of our objectives in China or fear even to discuss with the British and the French, with whom we now are associated in a world conflict, measures of common interest and concern in the Far East as well as elsewhere.
I recommend that we seriously consider making a declaration such as the Chinese suggest and that we remind the British and the French [Page 352] Governments that we regard it important that channels of communication be not closed.