711.94/1518: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received 12:10 p.m.]
400. Your 172, May 30, 2 p.m. 1. I am most grateful for your telegram under reference not only as a directive but as confirmation of my own views with regard to the potential consequences of the tragedy unfolding in Europe. With special reference to the last two paragraphs of your telegram, I have conceived it to be one of my principal duties to assist in the procuring of a reversal of Japanese policies and objectives in China and an adherence by Japan to principles and policies to which the United States and Great Britain are committed. I have never held the opinion that such reversal of Japanese policies could be procured only at the cost of modification of American opposition to the use of force by Japan in achieving her objectives in China. I have reported by several telegrams sent during the last 2 months that there was growing skepticism of the “New Order in East Asia” conceived in terms of exclusive rights and monopolies in China, which tended to confirm my belief that popular disillusionment in the China adventure combined with the additional strength of those elements in [Page 339] this country who believe in law and order and who realize that Japan’s economic well-being is unalterably bound up with economic and therefore political cooperation with the United States and the British Empire would in time make possible the desired reversal of Japanese policies. If conditions in Europe had remained as they were during the first 6 months of the war, there is no substantial reason to doubt that the movement in the direction desired by us would have accelerated. The position today is that the field here has been left to the Germans who are exploiting their military successes with a view to aggravating relations between the United States and Japan. A complacent view of the future would no longer be warranted.
2. I venture respectfully to hope that this telegram may have your special attention because I regard its substance and conclusion as of prime importance. My analysis of the situation is as follows:
3. Japan is at present in a state of political turmoil of unusual intensity. Dominating elements are united in the desire to bring about an early settlement of the hostilities in China but they are radically separated with regard to the nature of the settlement and the means to bring it about. While these various schools of thought cannot be grouped in clear cut categories, each enjoys support from considerable elements in the country including elements in the army and each manifests certain basic trends progressively receiving attention which are roughly characterized in the ensuing paragraphs.
4. One school of thought advocates an understanding with Soviet Russia for the partition of China on Polish lines. It is reported that Russia made some such proposal to Japan last autumn and that Japan turned it down. Informants have told us that Russia has recently renewed the proposal, desiring a free hand to cope with eventualities in Europe, including the Balkans and the possibility of eventually having to fight the Germans for control of the Baku oil fields, and that a Japanese colonel has already arrived in Moscow to negotiate. Informants look for fruition of this scheme by autumn and they maintain that the desire to settle the China conflict is so pressing that even this solution would be welcomed by the Japanese public as a whole. Some supporters of this thesis furthermore advocate seizure of the Netherlands East Indies before a German victory in Europe would give Germany a similar opportunity. They realize that economic reprisals by the United States would have to be faced but they maintain that no country has ever been destroyed by embargoes and that Japan would find a way out. They discount the possibility of war with the United States and believe that in any case the Japanese fleet has nothing to fear from the use of force. This faction, which expects to bring about the overthrow of the present Japanese Cabinet before autumn, is made up largely of members of the reactionary societies [Page 340] and younger officers in the army and is supported by few if any substantial statesmen. I believe that latterly these proponents of a deal with Soviet Russia have been losing ground, but with events in Europe moving at such a rapid pace, it is possible that Japan may feel that all her calculations are being upset and that she may be tempted to resort to desperate courses.
5. A second school of thought, which is fundamentally pro-German, has been given increased prestige by the recent German successes in Europe. The movement for close relations with Germany is being assiduously furthered by the German citizens in Tokyo whose main efforts are directed at strengthening anti-American sentiment through constant propaganda, especially among the military. The character of such propaganda indicates that the German thesis is that if such relations between the United States and Japan are directed and maintained in increasingly dangerous channels, the United States will be less prone to enter the European war against Germany. They aim to bring about a situation where the entry of the United States into the war against Germany would ensure a similar clash with Japan. The pro-German elements in Japan, especially those who foresee a German victory in Europe, argue that Japan can expect nothing from Great Britain or France and that the policy of the United States towards Japan is of so intransigent and rigid a nature that good relations between those two countries are impossible. This faction is believed to be largely supported by military elements but may well become broadened and strengthened in the event of continued German successes in Europe.
6. Finally there is the school of thought that recognizes the fundamental fact that Japan has more to gain from good relations and cooperation with the democracies than with the totalitarian powers. They clearly perceive the reasoning of those who advocate a self-sufficient economic bloc between China and Manchukuo and they realize that the reconstruction of China cannot succeed without the cooperation of the great commercial powers, particularly the United States and Great Britain. This faction includes most of the business world and influential men both within the Government and out of it, including some of the higher military officers. Many of them realize that the Wang Ching Wei regime cannot succeed and they are quietly working toward a reasonable peace with Chiang Kai Shek in order to provide a bridge for readjustment of relations with the countries with which Japan’s economic destiny lies, namely the United States and the British Empire. Representatives of this school of thought have pointed out to us that at present the democracies seem disinclined even to raise a finger to strengthen the hands of the forces in Japan which are striving for a return to moderate courses. They inquire whether, in the [Page 341] event of the conclusion with Chiang Kai Shek of a peace considered satisfactory by the American and British Government[s], they could be assured thereafter of economic assistance in assuring Japan’s normal supplies of raw materials as well as of much needed credits from the United States. What they feel to be necessary for the success of this movement toward the sort of peace that would be satisfactory to the United States and Great Britain is the creation of a feeling of assurance that in such an event Japan could depend on a resumption of the old relations of friendship with the United States and the countries of the British Empire. These exponents state frankly, not as a threat but as an [undoubted?] fact, that unless such a feeling of future assurance can replace the present widespread susceptibility that Japan has nothing to hope from the United States and Great Britain in the way of economic and financial cooperative assistance, the present Cabinet will fall during the next few months and may be replaced with a Cabinet of strong military and pro-German tendencies with disastrous results for Japan. Speculative reports of the impending fall of the Cabinet are being heard more frequently and from increasingly credible sources.
7. It has recently come to my attention that the Foreign Minister in conversation with an informant said to him that the American Ambassador had told the Minister that there could be no possibility of an improvement in the relations between the United States and Japan as long as the conflict in China continued. I have never presented the situation to the Minister in those words or in that form and it is obvious that he has drawn the logical implications from the observations which I have from time to time made to Mr. Arita and to his predecessors as duly reported to the Department. But the Minister’s remark to my informant, who authorizes me to quote him to Mr. Arita, seems logically to open the way to a further approach to the Minister with a view to clarifying the attitude of the United States, either under instructions or as conveying my own thoughts. If you approve of my seeking such an interview, I should like to present our attitude orally along the lines of your 172, May 30, 2 p.m., with special regard to paragraph 4 thereof, and then to endeavor to sum up the situation as follows:
8. My thought would be to say official was correct in attributing to me the view that the relations between our two countries cannot be expected to improve so long as there is a continuance of the multifarious interferences with American rights and interests in China, including inter alia the bombings of American property, the indignities to which American citizens are repeatedly subjected, and the penalizing of American commercial and financial rights and interests through monopolistic and other measures at the hands of Japanese authorities in China and also so long as the Japanese in China [Page 342] continue to endeavor to achieve various positive underlying national objectives by the use of force. On the other hand the United States desires and would welcome an early return to mutually good and helpful relations with Japan; that now more than ever the present state of world affairs dictates the mutual importance of the building up of such relations; that as soon as concrete evidence emerges that Japan genuinely desires and genuinely intends to relinquish force as an instrument of national policy and to direct its policy and efforts toward achieving its objectives by peaceful and legal methods and means, involving a discontinuance of past and current interferences with American rights and interests in China, the United States for its part will be disposed to view such a re-orientation of policy and efforts with sympathy and with the hope that the effectiveness of such a movement will in due course open the way to a new era in American-Japanese relations in which the future will hold out possibilities of helpful economic and financial cooperation. What I have chiefly in mind is to convey to the Minister and to others with whom I may have occasion to talk, without any commitments whatsoever, the thought that a new and mutually helpful era in American-Japanese relations is by no means impossible and that in my own belief the time is ripe for a positive move by Japan in that direction. I am not without hope that the striking of such a note in the midst of current Japanese perplexity might conceivably create an important influence on Government thought at this crucial moment.
9. Please instruct, and provided that the foregoing thoughts are approved, advise me of any further comment which you feel could properly and helpfully be made in such a suggested interview, apart from your previous instructions which I constantly retain in mind for use when occasion offers.