711.94/1669
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State
Mr. Secretary. I refer to the question which you raised in conversation with Mr. Hamilton and me this morning, namely, that of the possible desirability of taking diplomatic steps toward discouraging Japan from closer association with Germany and encouraging Japan toward a closer association with the United States.
[Here follows survey of factors involved in question under discussion.]
5. The Chinese do not wish today to make peace with Japan on the basis of any compromise which would leave Japanese armed forces in China. The Chinese are war weary, but no more so than are the Japanese. The Chinese are not confronted with any imminent necessity of making an early peace with Japan. Given a free field, the Chinese have at least even chances of outlasting the Japanese in a struggle which is highly burdensome to each of the two countries. It has been demonstrated during the past three years that the Japanese belief and representation that Japan is capable of creating in China conditions of peace, law, order, and stability are not well founded: the Japanese have shown themselves psychologically unqualified for the performance of that task. A “peace” settlement concluded between China and Japan now and under existing circumstances would have no solid foundations or anchorage. It would be inconsistent with American principles & with U. S. objectives in relationships with the Far East, and it would not profit the United States.
6. There is no more reason for assuming today that pledges which might be entered into by Japan’s leadership tomorrow would be lived up to by Japan than for making a similar assumption regarding similar pledges which might be made by the present leadership of Nazi Germany. True, the Japanese have some traditions of honor which the Nazis of Germany have not; and the Japanese have an emperor who, if he had his way, might try to keep faith; but, Japan is in the hands of a quasi-fanatical leadership just as Germany is in the hands of an utterly unmoral and ruthless leadership. In both cases, these leaderships would make to any foreign government any pledge which might be asked out of the making of which they might conceive that they would gain some advantage; in neither case would there be any | feeling on the part of those who made such pledges that the said pledges should be lived up to beyond the moment and the point at which living up to them would contribute to the attainment of their own national objectives.
[Page 335][Here follows review of American opposition to Japanese imperialism.]
8. An approach by this Government to the Japanese Government at this time—in the light of the known opposition of this Government and the American people to Japan’s policy of expansion by force, and in the light of the situation in Europe, and in the light of the officially proclaimed and widely publicized military unpreparedness of the United States—would be regarded by the Japanese leadership as a clear indication that this Government considers the United States incapable of taking any forceful action in the Far East, regardless of developments there, and that this Government in its own thinking commits the United States definitely to the taking of no such action. This would be taken by the Japanese leadership as a “go” signal as clear as, though dissimilar from, that which was given them by the German Government recently in regard to the Netherlands East Indies. The Japanese leadership would have no hesitation about giving an assurance that they fully intend to respect—in the long run and ultimately—all rights of other countries, including those of sovereignty and of equal opportunity. They would be ready then to “go”. They would consider that the western Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean were at their disposal. They would be enabled—with this assistance, in effect, by the United States—to force the Chinese to make with them a patchwork and flimsy agreement in the nature of a truce. They would be able to launch new predatory activities into and against other areas—involving Netherlands and French and British possessions and interests, and augmenting the Japanese menace to American interests. They would be enabled to cooperate more effectively, in effect, with Germany and with Italy than they are now able. They would be in better position than now to effectuate a temporary rapprochement with the Soviet Union.
Assume that the Japanese leadership, rightly or wrongly interpreting what they would regard as a “go” signal, did then make new moves of conquest. Would the cause of the Allies in Europe be better off or worse off in consequence of those moves? Would the situation of the United States be made more secure or less secure? The answers to these questions are, it seems to me, obvious.
9. The security of the United States in the world of an early tomorrow is going to depend partly on events over which we have no control and partly on what the Government and the people of the United States do immediately in the field of using and fabricating instruments and instrumentalities of force. We will not be made secure by a bringing into existence of agreements with countries whose policies are in direct conflict with our policies, whose courses of action run counter to our general interests and definitely menace [Page 336] our security, and whose word cannot be relied upon. The resistance which the Allies are making to Nazi Germany stands between us and the Nazi menace on the east. The resistance which the Chinese are making to Japan stands between us and Japan on the west. If the Allies are beaten, the menace to our security on the east will increase. If China is beaten, the menace to our security will increase on the west.
In reference both to the Allies and to China, we could, if we but would, materially influence the situation. Not much, however, by words, whether spoken or written. Considerably, only by positive contribution in the field of sinews of war.
Our security will depend on our armament.
10. The situation in the Far East, as between Japan and China, has for some months past been developing along the lines which we had estimated that it might and have hoped that it would take. Chinese resistance has been maintained; the Japanese have been unable to bring matters to a conclusion at any point; processes of attrition have been affecting the Japanese more adversely than the Chinese; the Japanese people have developed doubts; Japanese resources have become constantly more slender; the possibility of a gradual dissolution of the Japanese effort to conquer China has constantly increased. If we can but permit “Nature” to take its course, with a little help by giving some assistance to China and withholding some assistance from Japan, there is more than an even chance that the problem of the present Japanese-Chinese conflict will solve itself.
11. The situation in Europe being what it is, the situation in the Far East being what it is, and the limitations upon possible courses of action by this country being, within this country [and] at this moment, what they are, the most advisable course for this country to pursue for the present with regard to the Far East and the Pacific is to “sit tight”: make no new diplomatic move of major import, make no change in the disposal of the U. S. Battle Fleet, maintain the positions which we have taken, neither suggest nor assent to compromises, keep our hands free and our eyes and ears open.