711.94/1489: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

302. From High Commissioner Sayre.30 I have had three conversations with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The first of these took place on May 1 when I was presented to Mr. Arita by Ambassador Grew. At the conclusion of that conversation Mr. Arita expressed the hope that he might have an opportunity for a further talk with me, and subsequently he asked me to call on him yesterday, May 2. After an hour’s conversation yesterday, he said that he would like to think over some of the things which I had said in order that we might continue our talks. We met again today, and at Mr. Arita’s request we have agreed to meet on May 6 for a final conversation. The three conversations which I have already had with Mr. Arita are summarized as follows:

1. May 1. The conversation was devoted almost exclusively to the Philippine immigration bill. I explained that the organic act of the Commonwealth31 confers on the Philippine Assembly full and unrestricted power to regulate and also that subject to the provision that enactments concerning immigration shall not become law until approved by the President of the United States. I pointed out that the reduction in the annual quota of immigrants from each country from 1,000 to 500 was brought about by an amendment introduced during debate on the floor of the Assembly. I further explained that the bill was not discriminatory against Japan or any other nation and arose solely from the need for legislation to regulate problems of immigration from various parts of the world in order that difficulties which would inevitably arise from the unrestricted entry of aliens might be [Page 323] forestalled. I emphasized that the object of the Commonwealth Government in enacting the bill was to prevent and avoid future misunderstandings with the Japanese and other nations.

I next spoke of the activities of the Japanese Consul in Manila, and referred to the Consul’s efforts to cause President Quezon and the members of the Philippine Assembly to bring about amendments in the immigration bill favorable to Japan. I explained to Mr. Arita that if diplomatic representations of any kind with respect to the Philippines are to be made they should be made in Washington or Tokyo through ordinary diplomatic channels, or else the matter should be taken up in Manila through the High Commissioner’s office. I explained that the Japanese Consul’s action in talking directly to President Quezon and the members of the Philippine Assembly about pending Philippine legislation was therefore quite irregular.

Mr. Arita paid close attention to all that I said and made no objection or criticism. He said that he was glad to have my explanation and his silence appeared to indicate his assent to what I said.

2. May 2. Mr. Arita began the conversation by asking me what my views are with regard to the situation in the Far East, I said that if he wished me to speak unofficially and privately I would do so, but that he had to understand that I was not commissioned by my Government to express its views. I explained that I was here simply on a friendly visit to see Ambassador Grew and that any official statement of American views could be conveyed to the Japanese Government only through the Ambassador. Several times during the course of the conversation I reiterated and emphasized the unofficial nature of my conversation. Mr. Arita said on each occasion that he understood.

I began by saying that the present difficulties and tensions between the United States and Japan focused upon developments rising out of Japanese actions in China. I referred in this connection first to the unjustifiable bombings of American properties in China32 which had caused strong resentment among the American people, and second to the forcing out by the Japanese of American enterprises in China through various monopolistic practices.33 With regard to Japan’s future policies, I thought that sooner or later Japan would have to choose to throw in her lot either with the United States and the other democracies or with Germany and possibly Kussia. I referred to the complementary character of the trade between the United States and Japan, and I said that if Japan, taking the long view, should decide to throw in her lot with the democracies, it is manifestly to her interest to begin at the earliest possible moment to remove the difficulties between the United States along with the other democracies and herself. [Page 324] I touched on the dangers of unduly prolonging the tension in relations with the United States, and I said that it seemed to me important that Japan find a solution of her difficulties with China as soon as possible.

Mr. Arita expressed substantial concurrence with my statements. He added that the real difficulty was to find terms which would be equally acceptable to both China and Japan. Japan had already stated her terms and it was now up to Chiang Kai-shek to state his. He asked me if I knew whether General Chiang had any definite terms to propose. I replied that I did not know, as I had not talked with General Chiang, but that I had been told by Dr. Leighton Stuart that General Chiang had stated to him (Dr. Stuart) that Chinese Government would not enter into negotiations with Japan except upon the basis first, that China have complete and entire independence south of the Great Wall and second, that the question of Manchukuo either be left open or be the subject of negotiation. According to Dr. Stuart, General Chiang would insist upon the President of the United States mediating between the two countries. I emphasized to Mr. Arita the [that] I assumed no responsibility whatever for the accuracy of the information which I had received from Dr. Stuart and further that I had no idea how the President would respond to request by China and Japan that he use his good offices toward the reestablishment of peaceful relations between the two countries. Mr. Arita said that he would like to give study to my statements and he asked me to call on him again today.

3. May 3. Yesterday’s conversation took place at the Foreign Minister’s official residence, and it was agreed that I would return today to the residence. However, before the time of our appointment, Mr. Arita sent a message to the effect that he would meet me at the home of a private Japanese, who is, I understand, one of Mr. Arita’s close friends. When we met, Mr. Arita said that the Japanese Government must in every way support the Wang Ching Wei regime and such negotiations as there might well be with General Chiang would have to be carried on through such regime—to enter into direct negotiations would be bound to weaken the Wang regime. He felt that the chances are small of finding a basis of negotiations, in view especially of General Chiang’s lack of eagerness to enter into negotiations with Japan.

He assured me, however, that his Government would not deliberately avoid exploring any route which might lead eventually to peace, and he believed that the Japanese Government probably would be willing to send a representative to some neutral territory, such as Hong Kong, to confer with a representative of General Chiang with a view to searching for a basis of negotiation. The essential condition to proceeding with any such plan would be that it be kept completely [Page 325] secret. If a meeting could be held in secret and no publicity whatsoever given to it as yet and if a satisfactory basis for negotiations could be found, then it might be practicable to proceed with formal open negotiations. He said that he would consult the Prime Minister and that he would discuss the matter again with me on Monday following the luncheon which the Foreign Minister is giving in my honor. [Sayre.]

Grew
  1. Francis B. Sayre, United States High Commissioner in the Philippines.
  2. Philippine Independence Act, approved March 24, 1934; 48 Stat. 456.
  3. See also pp. 859 ff.
  4. See also pp. 484 ff.