793.94119/632
Dr. J. Leighton Stuart to President Roosevelt20
My Dear Mr. President: Claiming again the privilege of writing you regarding American aid to China in view of your concern over this subject as revealed in our conversation early in May, 1933, I should like to report to you some statements recently made to me by General Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking. It happens that I had been approached several times by Japanese representing groups anxious to find a solution for ending the present conflict. I always replied that there would be nothing gained by opening negotiations with the Chinese Government until the Japanese authorities were themselves ready to do so on the only terms that General Chiang could possibly consider and unless those who undertook these were really able to speak for the Japanese nation.
In such discussions I also tried to make it clear that not only I as an individual but the American Government and people as a whole desired China and Japan to have relationships of mutual benefit, whatever might be the consequences to ourselves, that we were only concerned that China be free from coercion and have her territorial integrity and political independence assured. In reporting these experiences to General Chiang he told me, however, that he would not consider any peace negotiations except through the President of the United States. This is because of his confidence in American friendship for China and in our sense of international morality. It is also a very genuine tribute to you personally. I asked if I might report this to our Ambassador and did so upon securing his permission. It may seem superfluous or even to savor of meddling for me to write to you in addition. But I felt that you might care for this unofficial account of what is a momentous decision.
In asking the Generalissimo if I might write you he consented on the express understanding that he was not asking for such mediation now nor would he be ready for any such proffer for some time yet, even from you. What I take him to mean is that the Japanese are a long way yet from being sufficiently desperate to agree to a procedure [Page 316] so contrary to their interest and so humiliating to their pride, and that China prefers to continue the struggle until a peace can be arranged that will guarantee her freedom from further aggression. This implies of course the withdrawal of all Japanese troops from south of the Great Wall and either the inclusion of Manchuria in the discussions or the frank recognition by both parties that this issue remains unsettled.
Knowing from your own lips of your active desire to do something for China may I bring to your attention what seems to be the most practical form such help could take, apart from an economic embargo against Japan. Let me first confess that I am writing now entirely on my own initiative and that this topic did not even enter in to my conversation with the Generalissimo. Could there not be some form of further financial assistance to China? The most effective would be an outright loan. This would strengthen confidence in the currency and reduce the danger of inflation. Or the actual money could be held in America to China’s credit under certain stipulated conditions. Or there might be an extension of long terms commercial loans, or some other method of helping toward exchange stabilization. Those qualified can advise on the technical aspects. But the essential point is that while there will probably be no financial collapse the heaviest strain is at this point and that with comparatively small assistance China’s financial and political integrity are assured. The risk seems to be very slight indeed and the benefits, even from the somewhat sordid standpoint of our own self-interest, are enormous. Meanwhile the sobering warning to Japan which such aid implies is a cogent secondary argument for it.
When the time for peace discussions draws near there are relevant questions as to anachronistic foreign rights in China (extra territoriality, settlements, etc.), which should be included. Among other advantages this would ease the Japanese approach to the whole issue.
If in some slight measure I can be of use to you in this delicate but supremely worth-while task which seems to be awaiting you, I am at your service.
With sincerest good wishes [etc.]
- Dr. Stuart was American president of Yenchkig University, Peiping. The Department, in its instruction No. 813, April 29, sent the Embassy at Peiping a copy of Dr. Stuart’s letter and authorized appropriate acknowledgment to be made.↩