793.94/15765
Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (Moore) to the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
It is very clear from the terms of Section 1 of the present neutrality statute that the mere existence of a state of war between foreign nations does not compel the issuance of a proclamation which would put into effect the provisions of the statute. Action is not to be taken unless “it is necessary to promote the security or preserve the peace of the United States or to protect the lives of citizens of the United States”. It is difficult to believe that any such necessity now exists.
Should some question be raised as to why the President did not issue a proclamation under the former neutrality statute,74 the answer is that it was construed as vesting in him discretion to find that a state of war existed and that in his opinion to make the Act effective by such a finding would be detrimental to Americans and American interests in China. At that time and since, the Japanese Government has refused to admit that it is making war.
Should the President or Congress after such a lapse of time since the hostilities began, now proclaim a state of war, the Japanese Government might or might not formally declare war against China. Should it declare war, our status in China might easily be more seriously difficult than it now is. In that event Japan might exercise authority as a real belligerent that would materially and injuriously modify the situation as it now is. For example, it might bring about a complete blockade of the Chinese coast; it might forbid, so far as Chinese ports are concerned, the ingress or egress of neutral vessels; it might even require the departure of any neutral vessels from the area it occupies in China and perhaps the departure therefrom of the citizens of a neutral country. There can be no doubt that American interests in China might become very much worse than they now are.
It can not be assumed that the purpose of the proposed enactment is to assist Japan and hurt China. Nevertheless, that would be the result. Japan would continue to make and pay for its purchases in this market and its ability to carry on hostilities would not be curtailed. On the other hand, there would be at least doubts raised as to the right of this as a neutral country to extend possible assistance to China in conducting the struggle. There can be no misgiving that the psychological effect on the Chinese would be injurious.
[Page 290]The question to be determined is not theoretical, but highly practical and the answer would seem to depend upon whether the enactment of the Resolution would do more harm than good to us, and whether it would do more harm than good to Japan or to China.
- Approved August 31, 1935, 49 Stat. 1081; as amended February 29, 1936, and May 1, 1937, 49 Stat. 1152 and 50 Stat. 121.↩