893.00/14532
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 8.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s despatch No. 1913 of February 6, 1939,71 reviewing significant developments in China during 1938, and to submit a review for 1939.
General summary:
1939 was another disappointing year for the Japanese who were still unable to accomplish their objective of effecting the military and [Page 286] political collapse of the Chinese Government. The Japanese military advance in China slowed down considerably, due perhaps to the lengthening lines of communications and the necessity of guarding those lines as well as important points in the occupied areas from Chinese attacks. Heavy and costly fighting occurred over widespread areas but the two important Japanese victories in Kiangsi and Kwangsi were counterbalanced to some extent by reverses suffered in Hupeh and Hunan. At the end of the year both Chinese and Japanese appeared determined to continue hostilities.
Japanese political plans for the occupied areas did not meet with much success. Effective Japanese authority in the occupied areas showed no considerable increase and continued to be limited to places under actual Japanese military control. The Japanese proceeded with ambitious plans for the economic exploitation of the occupied areas, making use of Manchurian monopoly forms, and the framework was laid for the eventual expulsion of all non-Japanese foreign trade, industry and investment; Japanese plans did not meet with all the success hoped for, due to lack of capital for industrial development, limited Japanese territorial control, and destructive floods in North China.
Japanese relations with the United States deteriorated, due to continued interference with American interests, and it became evident that Japanese and American policies in regard to China were diametrically opposed. Japanese relations with Great Britain and France also deteriorated, but these two powers, particularly Great Britain, pursued a conciliatory policy towards Japan because of involvement in Europe. Large scale hostilities broke out between Japan and Soviet Russia on the Outer-Mongolian border,72 but the German-Soviet non-aggression pact73 led to a reorientation of Japanese foreign policy and impelled Japan to conclude an armistice with the Soviets; it was felt, however, that the fundamental divergence of Japanese and Soviet interests would prevent any binding rapprochement between them.
Despite the economic and financial strain of the hostilities, difficulties in the international situation and recurring friction in the “United Front”, there was no apparent lessening of Chinese determination to continue resistance. The Chinese placed great reliance on the United States and hoped that fear of alienating American opinion would prevent British and French capitulation to Japan, and that [Page 287] possible American action, such as an embargo on the export of war supplies, would seriously weaken Japan.
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Political developments:
The National Government remained at Chungking throughout the year. There were no indications that Chinese determination to continue resistance had lessened, despite the uncertainties in the international situation, friction in the “United Front”, and the severe strain of war on the national economy. General Chiang Kai-shek retained the confidence of the nation and his influence was effective in settling the difficulties which arose between various factions in the government. Serious friction occurred from time to time between the Kuomintang and Chinese “communists” and clashes were reported in Kansu and Shensi between Central Government troops and units of the 8th Route Army; these difficulties were settled, usually on a compromise basis, and competent observers generally considered that the “United Front” would be maintained, so far as the continuance of hostilities against Japan was concerned. Rumors and reports of peace, usually emanating from Japanese sources in Shanghai and Hong Kong, were vigorously denied by the National Government, and Chinese spokesmen repeatedly stated that peace could only be concluded when China had achieved the objectives of its war against Japan. One important factor in maintaining and increasing Chinese determination to resist was the ruthless Japanese bombing of civilian populations, the most murderous instance of which occurred in Chungking in May.
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Respectfully yours,
Counselor of Embassy
- Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. iii, p. 137.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.↩
- Signed at Moscow, August 23, 1939; see Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1989–1941, pp. 76–78.↩