793.94/15647: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

80. 1. A prominent Japanese whose name is given in a subsequent telegram,66 expressed desire a few days ago to have a frank talk with [Page 283] me as soon as possible but as I was confined with bronchitis I arranged for him to meet a member of my staff.67 There will be found in the following paragraphs an outline of the important points brought up by this Japanese during the conversation, which took place on January 31. I concluded that the correctness of the estimate of this Japanese of the internal situation would depend largely upon the accuracy of his prediction that there would be reflected in the Diet the trend toward settlement of the conflict with China along liberal and enlightened lines. The courageous and straightforward expression of such trend which was given yesterday and [in?] the Diet by Deputy Saito as reported in our 79, February 3, 6 p.m.,68 would seem to lend considerable significance to the views of our Japanese informant who said:

(a)
Japan has miscalculated the fiber and character of the Chinese people in three important respects: (1st) Chiang Kai Shek despite repeated military reverses is politically more powerful and more secure today than he was three years ago; (2d) the Chinese have demonstrated extraordinary capacity for patriotism and national service; and (3d) the Chinese has proved himself to be an excellent soldier. These facts are slowly but inexorably producing among the Japanese people the belief that China is deserving of respect and is entitled to be treated by Japan on terms of equality.
(b)
The still dominant army and reactionary elements are even now opposed to settlement of the conflict on the basis of “no idemnity and no annexation”, as they believe that Japan cannot afford to rely merely on the good will of China for benefits to compensate for sacrifices made by Japan. However, the Japanese people are now undergoing the change in concepts of international relations which occurred in the Occident during and after the first Great War, and they will eventually come to the conclusion that relations with China must be conducted on the basis of cooperation and mutual respect. The development of Japanese thought along liberal lines would be clearly manifested in the Diet. Although there would be the usual chauvinistic speeches there would also be voiced a strong plea for settlement of the conflict on terms which would make possible the retention by China of its self-respect.
(c)
Since the outbreak of the war in Europe the United States has [become?] a more important source of supply for Japan than ever before, but considerations of national security transcend those of economic well being. If danger threatens from the direction of the United States, Japan will inevitably strive, for strategic and military reasons, to reduce the chances of trouble with Russia. Germany when confronted with war in the West reached an accord with Russia, and if Japan were placed in a similar position she would have to adopt the same course. If embargoes are imposed on Japan by the United States, they would have the two-fold result of suppressing the growing [Page 284] liberal trend in Japan and in adding strength to those who desire an alliance with Russia and Germany.

2. It is still too early to estimate precisely the repercussions to Saito’s speech. The press reports that there is a strong feeling in the Diet that he should be expelled but that within his own party, which is numerically the strongest party in the Diet, there is considerable support of the position taken by Saito and opposition to any drastic disciplinary action. There is no doubt that Saito has raised an issue. We feel that the manner in which this case will be disposed of will serve to indicate the strength of the opinion voiced in his speech.

3. I hear from a reliable source that Saito is close to General Ugaki and that his speech is regarded as an expression of the latter’s views.

Grew
  1. Adm. Kichisaburo Nomura, recently Minister for Foreign Affairs.
  2. Eugene H. Dooman, Counselor of Embassy.
  3. Not printed.