894.00/887: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 5—11:30 a.m.]
4. 1. The following is a paraphrase of a telegram recently sent to London by the British Ambassador here8 touching upon four [Page 253] points embodying views and arguments reported by Lord Lothian9 as having recently been put forward by the Department, together with Craigie’s comment thereon.
Point 1. The difference of opinion in Japan between the extremists and the moderates is simply one of methods and not of ultimate aims.
Comment: This opinion which is held by most journalists and writers on the Far East is superficial and requires much qualification. Although, of course, every Japanese is desirous of seeing his country’s fortunes advanced, a distinction must be drawn between the moderates who are in favor of impartial gradual economic expansion through the control of vital raw materials and the development of markets overseas, as the means of solving the organic economic ills of Japan; and the extremists who, urged on by a mystical fanaticism, have world domination as their aim. The extravagant jingoism of this latter group is what we hope to see terminated once and for all at the conclusion of the present China adventure.
Point 2. Forces of moderation in Japan are less important than moderate elements in Germany.
Comment: This contention is hardly borne out by recent events in Japan where a tendency has been observable for the influence of the moderate and extremist elements to go forward or recede in alternate cycles. As a matter of fact the so-called Fascist movement experienced a serious setback during the first 6 months of 1937 as a result of the defeat of the Cabinets of Hirota and Hayashi,10 and attempts by the extremists to reestablish themselves by adventures in China have brought Japan to the present serious pass. A reaction in the direction of moderation has already commenced and the defeat of the proposal for a military alliance with Italy and Germany as well as the decision to reopen the Yangtze River constitute notable successes for the moderate element. A widespread demand again exists for more popular representative government. It is difficult on the other hand to find in Germany any leader of the sort who is not in a concentration camp.
Point 3. Frustration of the ambitions of the Japanese on the Asiatic mainland will not increase the likelihood of a Japanese drive southward as long as the American Government maintains its present attitude.
Comment: The danger in this connection is that too severe pressure from the United States, which would undoubtedly be successful if continued for a quarter of a century, might have the more immediate result of putting into power a government of extremist complexion [Page 254] which would carry out a reorientation of the foreign policy of Japan. In such an event neither an effort to settle the China problem with Soviet cooperation nor an abandonment of the present attitude of neutrality toward the European Allied Powers is to be ruled out. Of course the latter would involve a threat to the interests of the Allies in the Pacific region. Submission to the policy of the United States as telegraphically reported (No. 911) to London by the Washington Embassy would entail a complete abandonment of the “new order in Asia” program and no Japanese Government could at present adopt such a policy and remain in office.
Point 4. A settlement of the minor disputes with the Japanese Government is not desirable as it would render insistence on major issues more difficult.
Comment: Such has not been our experience. The thesis suggests ignorance of the psychology of the Japanese. Minor [claims?] for compensation and minor questions which have arisen have created a resentment among the Japanese out of all proportion to their intrinsic magnitude and it would be altogether advantageous if the Government of Japan could be persuaded to settle them and thus bring about a better atmosphere for an approach to the major issues.
2. The remainder of Craigie’s telegram is devoted to an appraisal of the internal situation in Japan and a development of the attitude which the British Government should follow in the light thereof and of present world conditions. The following is a full summarized paraphrase of this portion of the telegram:
The internal situation in Japan is deteriorating progressively as a result of political stagnation, commodity shortage, rising prices and market inflationary tendencies. However, no indications exist that the nation as a whole is yet disposed to recognize the error of its China policy, present difficulties being ascribed to governmental maladministration, interference by third powers, et cetera. We, therefore, believe that the deterioration referred to would be more apt to be followed by the induction into office of an extremist government which would reorient Japan’s foreign policy either by the abandonment of neutrality or cooperation with the Soviet Union rather than as envisaged by the Foreign Office in its telegram to Lothian of December 17. Moreover, internal difficulties have become so formidable that were another moderate government to assume office, its continued existence would depend upon its achieving success in the field of foreign affairs, and it is for this reason that the present Government has attempted to improve relations with Great Britain and the United States. An extremist type of government on the other hand could achieve at least a temporary success and put off the day of reckoning by intensifying economic control and regimenting the nation—methods employed in Berlin and Rome. Those who welcome Japan’s present economic difficulties should bear this in mind. Even though for different reasons, an accommodation with the Soviet Union and [Page 255] departure from the policy would both ultimately spell failure for present Japanese policy in China, we could not contemplate aforenamed with equanimity as either would leave large areas of China exposed to Soviet penetration.
3. Reference is then made by Craigie to the policy outlined by the Secretary of State which was the subject of Lothian’s telegram No. 911 to London, of the subject of which this Embassy is not apprised. Craigie informs his Government that he views that policy as too drastic for the present “delicately balanced situation”. He adds that although if initiated a year ago, it might well have accelerated the present internal difficulties in Japan and at that time have tended toward a more moderate Japanese policy, at present with the European war in progress it is of the greatest importance, he asserts, to encourage the moderate tendencies here and less argument exists now for assuming the risk which would be involved by checking them through the adoption of too rigid a policy toward Japan. Present indications, he continues, are that Japan might be won over to a benevolent neutrality favoring the Allies, a development which he believes that the vast majority of Japanese would now sincerely welcome.
4. Craigie outlines in conclusion two courses which appear open to the British Government: (a) to continue to attempt to prevail upon the American Government to keep economic pressure against Japan within such bounds as will render tenable the position of the present Cabinet or similarly constituted ones: (b) to consider offering some form of compensation to Japan in fields independent of the China issue and thus, not only not conflict with American policy, but complement it. Finally Craigie observes that if the claims of the “have-not” powers are to be treated in the interest of world stability in a general post-war settlement any means which might be found during the early stages of the European conflict to offer Japan concrete evidence that her basic problems such as lack of raw materials, dependence on overseas markets, excess of population, et cetera, will be considered, would contribute to an early conclusion of the European war by eliminating potential dangers to the British position in the Far East and at the same time exert influence toward relieving Japanese pressure on China.
5. Although there are several points in Craigie’s discussion with which I do not agree, I find that in the main his position is substantially that which I have taken in several recent telegrams, notably my 689, December 18, midnight.11 I refer especially to those several portions of his telegram which take issue with the view that there is no important moderate body of opinion in this country, and that such [Page 256] differences of opinion which may seem to exist relate simply to methods and not to ultimate aims. As Craigie points out, the ability of the last Cabinet to defeat the German proposal espoused by the Japanese Army for an alliance12 has an importance which cannot be minimized, and the authoritative statements now being given out at frequent intervals that a political accord with the Soviet Union is not on Japan’s program is further evidence that sanity and a sense of realism have not altogether disappeared. The Department will find in the pouch which went forward on December 23 my despatch No. 4359 of December 1.13 I say therein that to expect that the Japanese Army can be discredited in Japan and thus be deprived of its control over national policy would be illusory, as it is inextricably bound up with the fabric of the entire nation. I also say that it is one of the functions of diplomacy to encourage the revival in Japan of good will and constructive statesmanship and of the conduct of foreign relations in the manner with which the name of Shidehara14 is associated. The events of intervening years have created new problems some of which are not capable in my opinion of solution by orderly processes, but within that limitation the capacity of the army to control policy and the conduct of constructive diplomacy need not be mutually irreconcilable. Without basic alteration of the Japanese political system the army cannot be deprived of its control of policy, but conditions have existed in the past and it is hoped will exist again which prevented the exercise of such control in directions incompatible with international commitments and good statesmanship.
- Sir Robert L. Craigie.↩
- British Ambassador in the United States.↩
- Koki Hirota and Gen. Senjuro Hayashi were Prime Ministers from March 9, 1936, to January 23, 1937, and from February 2 to May 31, 1937, respectively.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. iii, p. 622.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.↩
- Ibid., p. 604.↩
- Baron Kijuro Shidehara was Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs from June 1924 to April 1927 and from July 2, 1929, to December 11, 1931.↩