893.102 Tientsin/324: Telegram
The Chargé in Japan (Dooman) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 29—11 a.m.]
304. Our 296, June 26, 5 p.m.
1. The British Ambassador began a conversation with me this morning by emphasizing that in the course of the negotiations which would be had with the Japanese with regard to the situation in Tientsin he proposed to do nothing which would be embarrassing to the American Government. Referring to statements appearing in the local press to the effect that the round table conference would take up general questions affecting British policy and attitude toward China or Japan, Sir Robert said that he had proposed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the conference deal only with the local situation at Tientsin and with questions immediately arising out of that situation and that this proposal had been accepted by Mr. Arita as a basis for negotiations.
2. Sir Robert believes that the basic cause of the difficulty at Tientsin is the currency and allied questions. He hoped it might be possible to find a solution of the terrorist issue and other issues involving police administration. However, a point would eventually be reached where the Japanese would inevitably bring up the currency and related issues.
He was well aware that these are of definite concern and interest to the American Government as well as to the British Government. Therefore, he proposes when this point will have been reached in the negotiations to ask the Japanese for a clear statement of their proposition, and then to observe that any proposed agreements affecting currency, exchange control, etc., would need to be examined by the American Government and other governments having interests in the affected area.
3. Sir Robert received the impression from a telegram sent to London by his colleague at Washington that there would be an adverse reaction internally to British policy if the British Government were [Page 207] to make concessions to the Japanese Government under pressure of the indignities inflicted on British nationals in Tientsin. He wished me to make it clear to you (a) that any “concessions” made would relate to local issues and not to any principle of general policy and (b) that there is no question of the British negotiating with the Japanese if the indignities are not stopped before the conference in Tokyo begins. He had not, however, laid down the cessation of indignities as a formal condition to entering into negotiations with the Japanese, for the obvious reason that a demand of that kind would only have strengthened the already powerful opposition of the Japanese military to any mutiny [sic] in Tokyo, thus serving to defeat his first aim; but he had, on his Government’s instructions, said to the Foreign Minister that he assumed that the indignities would be stopped, as it would be obviously impossible otherwise to conduct negotiations. Sir Robert believes that measures to this end are already being taken to relax the severity of the “blockade” measures.
4. There is one point which is giving Sir Robert concern. In his view, unless the situation at Tientsin can be dealt with in a satisfactory manner, it is capable of leading to extremely grave consequences. The British rights in the Concession are, he realized, a matter of concern only to the British Government and he could well understand the natural desire of the American Government not to become involved in issues affecting those rights. The basic cause of the difficulty at Tientsin being, however, fundamentally fiscal questions he doubts very much whether the situation can be cleared up and a satisfactory position stabilized without some modification of the British attitude taken thus far with respect to the various fiscal issues. He was thus faced with an extremely difficult and delicate problem, i. e., of coming to an understanding with the Japanese which would preserve the British position in the Concession and avoiding at the same time any arrangement which would be injurious to American or British interests in North China.
He expressed the hope that I would feel free to tell him whenever I felt that the trend of the discussions at the conference might involve adverse effects on American interests. With that in view, he would keep me fully and immediately informed of the negotiations.
5. It is my intention to relay to the Department all information supplied by Sir Robert as soon as it is made available to me, in order that the Department might be in a position to express formally to London or informally to Sir Robert through me its views on points under discussion.
6. Because of delay in arrival of British and Japanese officials from North China, the conference is not to open until early next week.
Repeat to Peiping for relay to Tientsin, Chungking, Shanghai.