893.102 Tientsin/317: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

905. I have just seen Halifax. He said that the Cabinet had a special meeting again with all the naval authorities yesterday afternoon regarding the Japanese situation to see whether there was any possibility of releasing capital ships to sail to Singapore. By weakening the situation slightly in the North Sea they felt they could take one from there and possibly three out of the Mediterranean, which would leave the eastern Mediterranean in rather a bad way and might upset Turkey and Greece but with all of that, four ships were the most they could possibly send and having sent them to Singapore there is nothing for them to do but sit there because the Admiralty advises there certainly would not be enough strength to take on the Japanese Navy. With that in mind they have adhered to their original idea that they must back out the best way they can. They are advised by the Japanese Prime Minister that he is rather upset by the way the army is acting at Tientsin and that he is willing to negotiate and they hope to have the word some time this afternoon or tomorrow that this is to be done. Halifax is very doubtful that anything will be done because he believes they are playing a double game, upbraiding the army to Craigie and urging them to go on at Tientsin. If they cannot take them on for a fight, they must give in if Japan is not willing to arbitrate. What form this will take Halifax does not know. He realizes that it is having a very weakening effect on Britain’s prestige and he also realizes that British public opinion is being aroused frightfully and he is only afraid that they are finally going to get mad and demand that something be done when nothing can be done and if anything is done it will be a great mistake. So for the present, the situation looks bad if Japan presses on.

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I have since learned from the Foreign Office that they have received word from Ambassador Craigie that the Japanese Government consents to negotiate at Tokyo on the Tientsin issue alone. This is not to be made public until tomorrow afternoon. In this connection I think we should watch the British moves in connection with the new Japanese-controlled banks in China because a change in the British attitude to one or both of them is surely a card they could play at Tokyo in trying to work out a compromise on the Tientsin situation.

Kennedy
  1. Telegram in two sections; for section 2, see vol. i, section entitled “Anglo-French-Soviet Negotiations …”