793.94/14922
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
In the conducting of our relations with countries of the Far East, and especially with Japan, we are making our principal objective that of discouraging interference by Japan with American interests in China. In the field of action, we are constantly making representations to the Japanese authorities. In the course of so doing, we are in effect constantly pointing out to the Japanese how they might, while going ahead with their aggression against an attempted conquest of China, avoid encountering substantial opposition by and from the United States.
Query: Is it more important to this country that interference with American interests in China be temporarily prevented than that Japan’s attempted conquest of China be not consummated? Are the injuries which the Japanese are doing or might do to American interests in China of more consequence to the United States than the disregard [Page 656] by Japan of her treaty pledges to this country and the violation by Japan of various and sundry basic principles in which this country believes? Is Japan’s violation of her pledges with regard to the open door a greater offense against this country than Japan’s violation of her pledge not to resort to war in pursuit of national policy?
Suppose that, for the time being, Japan listened to our remonstrances and took our advice that she refrain from interference with American interests in China; and suppose that Japan were to succeed in conquering China; would we not be confronted with this situation: first, Japan would have achieved her conquest by and through violation of certain of her pledges to us and violence to our principles, and, second, Japan would, in conformity with her concept of the “new order in Asia”, thereafter largely destroy such of our interests in China as had up to that time survived?
Ought we not, in the field of action, broaden the scope of and perhaps shift the emphasis of our policy? Ought we not concern ourselves more about the problem of seeing to it that Japan does not conquer China than about discouraging interference by Japan with American interests in China?
Must we not, toward safeguarding both our interests in China and our interests in general, assert ourselves toward ensuring the continuance of Chinese sovereignty in China (as distinguished from acquisition by Japan of a substantive control over China and the Chinese)?
It has been a traditional policy of this country to contend for and contribute to the survival of China as an independent state (“integrity of China”); this country’s policy in that respect has been coupled with—in fact was conceived as a supplement to and a means toward making good—our policy of contending for and giving support to the principle of equality of commercial opportunity (“open door”) in and with regard to China. If we want equality of opportunity in China, we must have a China.
Both the principle and practice of the open door and the principle and practice of non-aggression (order with and under law) are at stake in the Japanese-Chinese conflict. It is not sufficient for us to contend for the open door. If China is conquered, we will have no open door.
It is easier to give assistance to China than to place obstacles directly in the way of Japan.
We have already given a certain amount of assistance to China. Ought we not be making it a definite part of our policy to add to the measure and the methods of assistance by this country to China?
The British Government is at this moment taking a new step toward assisting China (currency loan). This Government has given the British Government an assurance that we would study possibilities [Page 657] of action here with a hope that we would be able to take some new and parallel step in the same direction. Is not the moment at hand when, if at all possible, we should be taking some such step?