740.0011 European War, 1939/284: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 13—1:35 p.m.]
1942. For the President and the Secretary: Daladier lunched with me alone today. His conversation with Chamberlain yesterday dealt with the problems of conducting the war in Europe. The Far East was not mentioned.
Daladier suggested to Chamberlain British aviation should be used to bomb military objectives in Germany including the Rhine bridges. Chamberlain flatly refused to consider the use of British bombardment planes against Germany at the present time stating that he did not wish to provoke German bombardments of Great Britain and especially of British aeroplane factories which at the moment were turning out a great many machines. He was also apprehensive of [Page 425] the effect of any British bombardment of military objectives in Germany on public opinion in the United States.
Daladier argued that this attitude on the part of Great Britain left the German air force free to bombard Poland at will. Chamberlain expressed the opinion that Poland was lost in any case.
Daladier did not agree with this opinion and told Chamberlain that he would send further French aeroplanes and tanks via Rumania in support of Poland. He has already given orders for these to be shipped at once.
Daladier was satisfied in the highest degree by the success of the French attacks in the Saar district.
Chamberlain assured Daladier that the German submarine warfare against British vessels was extraordinarily ineffective compared to the German submarine warfare at the outset of the war in 1914.
The question of Italy was discussed and the conclusion was reached that it was impossible to be certain of Italy’s intentions since, in spite of the hostility to war of at least nine-tenths of the Italian people, Mussolini remained among the tenth who desired to enter war on the side of Germany. No offers in the nature of bribes will be made to Italy and on the other hand no threats will be made against Italy. In other words, a wait and see policy will be adopted in respect of Italy.
Daladier said that he felt the position of Italy would be determined largely by the action of the Congress of the United States in respect of the Neutrality Act.36 If the embargo against shipment of arms and munitions should be lifted quickly Italy would continue to remain neutral and finally would fight on the side of France and England. If, on the other hand, the change in the Neutrality Act should be greatly delayed or refused by the Congress, Italy might come into the war on the side of Germany.
[Here follows information regarding proposed changes in the French Cabinet.]
I trust that you approve of my not reporting in advance such events as the flight of Prime Minister Chamberlain to France. I recall the sinking of the Hampshire with Field Marshal Kitchener37 and believe that we cannot be too careful about giving advance information of such voyages.