893.01 Manchuria/1501: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:50 p.m.]
120. My 104, February 15, 3 p.m.61 While there have been a few comments in the local Chinese press indicating Chinese disappointment with German recognition of Manchukuo,62 Chinese authorities appear to accept situation calmly. They are probably more interested in continued purchase of German military supplies and service of military advisers. I think German attitude was expected. It is my opinion that it does not change materially Far Eastern situation. [Page 107] it gives a certain amount of encouragement in regard to Japanese who were already embarked upon military conquest of China for the purpose of destroying the Chinese nationalism founded on occidental democratic and capitalistic rather than communistic lines. Soviet Russia will not attack Japan but may be expected to aid China to prolong campaign, content with the hope that Japan will exhaust itself in China. A Germany involved with Soviet Russia can hope for little assistance from a Japan preoccupied with China.
Far more serious consideration will doubtless be given by the Chinese to future attitude of England. Resignation of Eden is feared as possibly portending a shift in British policy to one that will be more acceptable to Japan. T. V. Soong63 arrived at Hankow yesterday. Since despatch of Leith-Ross64 to China in 1935, the Chinese adoption of his advice in reform of Central Bank and linking of Chinese currency with that of Great Britain, Soong’s chief interests there [in relation?] to Chinese Government lay in his possible usefulness in bolstering Government’s credit abroad because he enjoyed confidence of British finance. Soong may now find that he has lost that support. In this connection please see reports forwarded to Office of Naval Intelligence by McHugh65 from Hong Kong by Clipper February 9 and 17, dated January 20 and February 8 respectively,66 especially with reference to part played by Rogers of Bank of England in career and prospect of Soong. Advice understood to have been conveyed to London by Craigie, mentioned in Tokyo’s telegram No. 100 of February 12, noon, may find Chamberlain67 readier to listen than Eden might have been. I learned last evening from British Embassy that Kung68 has held up instructions to Commissioner of Customs mentioned in my 102 of February 14, 11 a.m.,69 after receiving British advice mentioned in my 117, February 21, 3 p.m.,70 waiting to see what better method of preserving customs to Chinese British may have to offer. Furthermore Chinese under present conditions do not desire to go against wishes of British Government. A cynical interpretation of British advice to Kung would be that British Government desires door left open for Maze71 and his commissioners to take service with a Japanese fostered Chinese Government, thus maintaining formal customs and integrity in the interest of British loans secured on customs.
[Page 108]Sent to Peiping, Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo and show to Commander-in-Chief.
- Vol. iv, p. 267.↩
- See pp. 441 ff.↩
- Former Chinese Minister of Finance.↩
- Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Chief Economic Adviser to the British Government.↩
- Capt. James M. McHugh, U. S. M. C, Assistant Naval Attaché in China.↩
- Neither found in Department files.↩
- Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister.↩
- H. H. Kung, Chinese Minister of Finance and President of the Executive Yuan (Premier).↩
- Post, p. 656.↩
- Post, p. 659.↩
- Sir Frederick Maze, British Inspector General of the Chinese Maritime Customs Administration.↩