793.94/11754: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 21—noon.]
665. 1. We have received in the strictest confidence from an entirely reliable Japanese an indication of the trend of thought at the conferences which began last week between the Government and Imperial Headquarters. The informant stated little that has not previously been said privately to me by Hirota or publicly by other responsible Japanese. However, his statement seems to us of considerable importance at this time because it is the first and only credible indication which we have received of the views predominating at these conferences.
- (a)
- When the conflict with China began it was the policy of the Japanese Government to avoid aggravating the situation. However, after 5 months the conflict has extended to proportions which were not originally contemplated: the Capital of China has been taken, large parts of China are under Japanese occupation, and—most important of all—a heavy sacrifice in human life has been involved. The return to Japan of the ashes of the soldiers killed at the front has impressed [upon] the Japanese people as nothing else could have done the importance of Japan’s obtaining a final and lasting liquidation of its difficulties with China. Japan cannot therefore agree today to a settlement on the comparatively moderate terms which were offered to China at the beginning of the conflict and which would have been acceptable prior to the fall of Nanking.
- (b)
- Although Chiang Kai Shek has declared in his most recent public statement that Nanking has lost its strategic importance, it [Page 830] cannot be denied that the loss of Nanking is politically a matter of supreme importance to China. If the Chinese Government fails to appreciate this fact and affirms and demonstrates by action that it will continue the struggle, the Japanese Government cannot further be hampered by effort to keep the situation from being aggravated.
- (c)
- If the Chinese Government makes good its threat to resort to a war of endurance, whatever further action which may be taken by Japan will have but one objective, that is, to bring the hostilities to an end as quickly as possible.
- (d)
- No declaration of war against Russia is under contemplation (this statement is directed at speculative estimates in the affirmative made by a number of my colleagues).
2. The foregoing is practically a full verbatim account of the statement of the informant. Although several possible developments such as attack on Canton or declaration of war against China occur to us which fit well within the framework of his presentation of the situation, any estimate which I might make on the basis of the scant information now available would be little more than attempt at prophecy. I feel that I am on safe ground only in expressing the belief that the Yangtze River incidents have brought to the surface a latent disunity of thought among those elements represented at the above mentioned conferences with regard to Japan’s policy after the capture of Nanking. The military mind has we believe begun to realize the dangers inherent in military action in China and may even be prepared to take precautions against involvement with the United States and Great Britain but the information presented in paragraph 1 indicates the probability of there being nevertheless an extension of declared military objectives.
Repeated to Shanghai for Hankow.