Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/11763: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 21, 1937—2 p.m.
[Received 3:11 p.m.]

333. The following is a brief summary of statements made to me yesterday in the strictest confidence by the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow.

1. I am secretly leaving for China within 2 or 3 days to confer with Chiang Kai Shek and to explain to him the Soviet attitude with respect to China. The journey which is by airplane across central Asia will be hazardous. Before departing I desire to give you to understand something of what I have been encountering during the last year.

2. I came to Moscow as Ambassador in November 1936. Before my appointment I had a reputation of being a firm supporter of Chinese-Soviet friendship. I had been on friendly terms with Soviet officials in China including Bogomolov, the Soviet Ambassador; had already visited the Soviet Union on several occasions; and had discussions in Moscow regarding difficult Soviet relations with some of the highest Soviet officials.

3. One of the purposes of my mission was to obtain assurances from the Soviet Government that if China pushed Japan so far as to make war inevitable the Soviet Union would support China both with supplies and armed forces.

4. Although while in China Bogomolov had been free in making oral assurances of Soviet readiness to assist China in case of war with Japan, and, in Moscow at the time of my arrival, I was unable to get in touch with him. He did call upon me to say good-bye prior to his return to China some time after my arrival but avoided discussing political problems. I found that Litvinov⁴⁴ was also evasive. In response to my overtures he usually replied that he preferred to have important matters involving Soviet-Chinese relations discussed at Nanking.

5. Bogomolov and influential groups in China friendly to the Soviet Union continued during the spring and summer of 1937 to endeavor to make the Chinese Government believe that if it would undertake to offer armed resistance to Japan it could confidently expect the armed support of the Soviet Union. For various reasons I insisted that my Government give serious consideration to no assurances which were not in writing. My insistence was interpreted by pro-Soviet circles in China as implying lack of confidence in Soviet integrity. Now that the Soviet Government has failed to give the assistance which these circles stated it would give, they are contending, instead of conceding that I was right, that my lack of confidence in Soviet oral promises had undermined Chinese-Soviet relations and that I am responsible, therefore, for the failure of the Soviet Government to enter the conflict.

6. The following incident illustrates my difficulties. In October a Chinese Communist visited Stalin and reported to his friends in China, who in turn reported to the Chinese Government, that on a certain date the Soviet Government would join China in its war against Japan. In response to an inquiry from my Government, I replied that my information would indicate that the Soviet Government had no intention of permitting itself to be involved in the hostilities in the Far East in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the friend of the Soviet Union in China insisted that the Communists were in a better position than I to report on Soviet intentions. When upon the date mentioned the Soviet Government made no move towards giving armed assistance to China my Government ordered me to ask why Stalin had failed to keep his promise. Stalin, in reply to my inquiries made to him indirectly, stated that he had never made the promise credited to him.

7. I must state out of fairness that neither Litvinov nor any other high Government official in Moscow has ever given me any promises of Soviet armed support to China against Japan. Nevertheless, they have not taken recommended measures to end the campaign of belligerency carried on by their representatives and friends in China.

8. Bogomolov, upon his return to the Soviet Union several weeks ago, was arrested. It is my understanding that the charges against him are not that he had made unauthorized promises to the Chinese Government but that he was too optimistic in reporting to his Government the ability of the Chinese armed forces to resist Japan. Apparently the Soviet Government had been led by Bogomolov to believe that the Chinese resistance to a Japanese attack would be much more stubborn than it has been effectual, and a feeling is commencing to be manifest in high circles that Japan may be able to emerge from the war much more quickly and in a much better economic and military condition than had been anticipated. It is beginning to fear that the war instead of weakening Japan may result in adding to its strength, prestige and aggressiveness.

9. Although for internal consumption the Chinese Government is endeavoring to assure its people and the world that time is on its side and that if the Chinese armies continue to offer resistance Japan will inevitably become exhausted, nevertheless, there is a growing feeling among informed Chinese circles that Japan by following a ruthless policy of depriving the population of conquered portions of China of even their elementary needs will be able to mobilize supplies in sufficient quantities to permit it to carry on the war for a protracted period.

10. I have talked with the new Soviet Ambassador to China and will tell you in confidence that I am convinced that he is a Smirnov who was replaced recently as Soviet Assistant Commissar for Defense.

Henderson

44. Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs.