Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1936, The Far East, Volume IV

893.0146/515

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart), Temporarily in Washington

[Washington,] August 3, 1936.

Conversation:	Brig. General Stanley D. Embick, Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department;
	Mr. Hornbeck;
	Mr. Lockhart.

Mr. Hornbeck opened the conversation by showing to General Embick a clipping from the North China Star (Tientsin) indicating that the lease for the barracks and other property occupied by the United States 15th Infantry at Tientsin had recently been renewed. Mr. Hornbeck stated that, inasmuch as the matter of the retention of the 15th Infantry in North China had recently been under discussion, he had brought along Mr. Lockhart, Counselor of the Embassy at Peiping, so that he might give to General Embick his views on the situation in North China, especially with regard to the need for keeping the 15th Infantry at Tientsin. General Embick stated that there had been some recent discussion of the question of withdrawing the 15th Infantry because the War Department felt that the troops were not serving any useful military purpose at Tientsin. He stated that in the event of any war involving North China the troops would be awkwardly situated and that there would be no possibility of their participating in any successful military activity. Mr. Lockhart stated that from the point of view of military operations it could be said that the troops are perhaps of no military value but that from the point of view of providing protection in case of the need of evacuating American nationals from North China, incident to Sino-Japanese disturbances or arising from other causes requiring their removal, they would be of the very greatest value. Mr. Lockhart stated that it would be difficult to foresee when an emergency might arise and cited the suddenness with which the disturbances arose at Hankow in 1927 and the fact that the American Navy was at hand to render protection to the American nationals at that place;¹⁷ that the absence of the Navy at that time would have placed American citizens in a much more dangerous position at Hankow and that a similar situation might conceivably arise, with equal suddenness, in Tientsin or Peiping; that Peiping was considerably removed from the sea and that the object of keeping the Infantry at Tientsin and the Marines at Peiping was to keep communication open to the sea. Mr. Lockhart cited one instance when this had become necessary and it was stated that the Chinese authorities could not be relied upon to perform this function in an emergency. Mr. Hornbeck referred to the disturbances in Spain and to the need for protection for American nationals until they could reach a place of evacuation.¹⁸ Mr. Lockhart remarked that a failure on the part of the Chinese authorities in similar circumstances to render protection would make it necessary for American troops and Marines to step into the breach and that they would unquestionably do so. Mr. Lockhart stated that the troops had manned barricades during the Sino-Japanese troubles of 1931 at Tientsin and prevented bad elements from passing into the foreign residential areas, and that the situation in North China is such that they might be called upon again in similar circumstances or to give protection to Americans should it become necessary to evacuate them. General Embick again referred to the awkward situation in which the 15th Infantry would be placed in case of a Sino-Japanese war and stated that in any kind of war in North China the 15th Infantry would have no military value. Mr. Lockhart remarked that it was his impression that it was the plan of the Commandant of the 15th Infantry, in case fighting should be adjacent to the barracks or should involve the regiment in some conflict with the opposing factions, to have recourse to internment in the British or French Concessions at Tientsin. Mr. Lockhart stated that the barracks were located on Chinese soil immediately adjoining the British Concession.

Mr. Hornbeck suggested that Mr. Lockhart might tell General Embick the attitude of the American Ambassador, Mr. Johnson, on the subject of the removal of the Embassy and armed forces from Peiping. Mr. Lockhart stated that as he understood the matter the Ambassador favors the retention of the main part of the Embassy at Peiping and that he also favors the retention of the 15th Infantry at Tientsin and the Marine detachment at Peiping; that he sees no need to change the present American diplomatic and military set-up in North China with the exception that the Ambassador expects to spend more time in Nanking after his residence at that place has been completed. Mr. Lockhart said that in his view the presence of the troops in North China, as well as the retention of the Embassy at Peiping, had the effect of deterring the Japanese and that he felt that the Japanese were not anxious to have any trouble with any foreign military contingents in North China although, as pointed out, there were evidences that the Japanese were not so friendly in that area to foreign nationals as they once were. Mr. Lockhart stated that there was increasing signs of dislike of foreigners on the part of the Japanese soldiery who, after all, are somewhat more arrogant in a foreign land than they are in their own country. He expressed the view, in reply to a question from General Embick, that the Japanese have no immediate objective south of the Peiping-Tientsin area but that ultimately, having more or less settled in the area between the Great Wall and Peiping and Tientsin, they might elect to extend their dominance down to the Yellow River. He remarked that this was guesswork and he also stated, in reply to an inquiry from General Embick, that he felt the Chinese could not put up any substantial resistance unless and until they were more thoroughly trained in a military way, better equipped and better officered than at present. Mr. Lockhart, in reply to a question by General Embick, stated that he believed that Japan’s interests in North China are based on two considerations: (1) military strategy in a possible armed conflict between Russia and Japan (which he regards as not imminent) and (2) economic exploitation by Japan of North China. Mr. Lockhart in closing his part of the conversation referred to the responsibility shared with other nations under the Protocol in protecting foreigners in North China and said that it seemed to him necessary to consult the interested powers before taking any definite steps in the direction of withdrawing troops and in conclusion remarked that he hoped no change would be made at this time in the present arrangements.

The conversation was closed by a brief discussion between Mr. Hornbeck and General Embick on the relative position of the United States and Great Britain in affairs in the Far East. Mr. Hornbeck expressed the view that the United States has much more ultimately at stake in events that take place in the Pacific Ocean than has Great Britain and General Embick advanced the view that Great Britain’s interests exceeded those of the United States but it appeared that this view was based largely on the theory that Japan would ultimately take possession of the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, the Mandated Islands in the South Seas and then would threaten India and Australia, which ultimately might end in a break-up of the British Empire. Mr. Hornbeck remarked that this was taking the conflict out of the Pacific and into the Indian Ocean and that so long as the question is confined to the Pacific Ocean the ultimate concern of the United States is greater than that of Great Britain in that region.

17. See Foreign Relations, 1927, vol ii, pp. 236 ff.
18. See vol. ii, pp. 626 ff.