124.93/324
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck)
The question asked is: Why not move the American Embassy in China from Peiping (presumably to Nanking)?
Officers of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, having previously given this question consideration at intervals during the past eight years, have, in response to this inquiry, given the question renewed consideration; have, in doing so, given renewed consideration to the co-related question, why not withdraw the American armed forces stationed at Peiping and Tientsin; have, in connection with both questions, conferred with appropriate officers of the Army and of the Navy; and have produced memoranda setting forth the facts and stating their conclusions. The memoranda, separate but closely interrelated, are attached hereunder.8
The conclusions arrived at are that the Embassy should not be moved from Peiping at this time and that the American armed forces stationed at Peiping and Tientsin should not be withdrawn at this time.
With regard to the Embassy, it is shown that, since the removal of the Chinese capital from Peiping to Nanking in 1928, the majority of the foreign governments, including the American Government, have made various readjustments in their diplomatic “set-up” in China in accordance with and to meet the needs of changes in the situation there, as those changes have occurred. It is shown that there is a measure of uncertainty with regard to the continuance of the [Page 536] seat of the National Government at Nanking; that the provisions of certain treaties and agreements have to be taken into consideration; and that political implications and possible consequences of a removal, if made, at this time are factors to be considered. It is shown that the difficulty of obtaining adequate housing facilities at Nanking (or at Shanghai) together with the question of expenditures which would have to be made were the diplomatic establishment to be removed to either of those cities have been and are obstacles to such a removal. It is pointed out that, even if the Embassy establishment were removed, it would still be desirable or necessary for this Government to have official representation at Peiping, and that, therefore, removal of the Embassy would not put an end to certain hazards which may attend the presence in Peiping of American official representation. It is stated, in conclusion, that:
“Under these circumstances, the preponderance of factors seems still to point to the inadvisability of removing the Embassy establishment at this time and in toto from Peiping. It seems preferable to ‘carry on’ as at present, with the Embassy headquarters in Peiping and the sub-embassy at Nanking, continuing to make readjustments gradually and with due consideration of common interests and methods and of changes in the situation as they occur.”9
Impossible of disassociation from the question of the removal of the Embassy establishment from Peiping is the question of the withdrawal of the American armed forces stationed at Peiping and at Tientsin.
In the memorandum discussing that question, it is pointed out that up to the present time all who have studied the question have repeatedly arrived at the conclusion that, although it is desirable that these forces be withdrawn at the earliest possible moment, such withdrawal would at the existing moment be not advisable. There is given an account of the history of the presence and the mission of these armed forces, of the legal authority under which they were sent, beginning in 1900, and by which they have been maintained. There is given an account of the present “set-up”, under which the American contingents have a total of 1, 256 men (officers and enlisted men). It is pointed out that the mission of these forces has not been and is not combat or coercion but has been and is guard duty and potential escort. It is indicated that these forces play a part in the system of cooperative action which has been an objective of American policy in regard to the relations of the principal treaty powers with each other in China and in their dealings with the Chinese Government; that precipitate withdrawal of these American forces at this time [Page 537] might be expected to be misinterpreted both by the Chinese and by the Japanese; and that the Chinese Government and people do not now object to the presence of these forces but look upon these forces as a stabilizing element in a critically disturbed political situation. There is cited testimony by Major General Kilbourne, in a report written in December last,10 strongly expressing, in reversal (after investigation) of an earlier opinion of his, the opinion that these forces should not at this time be withdrawn. Facts and opinions are adduced to the effect that the question of cost of maintenance is negligible.
In conclusion it is stated that: it is the opinion of officers of the three Departments who have recently studied the matter that the danger of complications with Japan through the continued presence of these American forces in North China is not substantially greater now, or likely to be, than it has been in the past; that a precipitate withdrawal of them would in all probability be misunderstood and be used to the disadvantage of the United States and of American policy; that the Department is desirous that all American troops be withdrawn from China whenever the advantages of their being there become outweighed by the disadvantages and when their withdrawal can be effected without embarrassment to American interests; that for the time being very useful purposes are served by their presence there; and that, in case any other powers maintaining such forces in China should indicate an inclination to withdraw their forces, or if developments occur substantially altering the situation with regard to this question, the Department would expect promptly to reconsider the whole question in consultation with the War and Navy Departments.11