793.94/8510
The Consul at Harbin (LaMont) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson)10
Sir: With reference to the deadlock in the Nanking negotiations, and the recent coup at Sian, I have the honor to submit an estimate of the way in which people of the Chinese race here would react to a Sino-Japanese conflict.
[Page 435]It is difficult to obtain information concerning the reactions of the native population. For one thing, there is no officer stationed here who speaks the Chinese language, and even if there were, he would experience great difficulty in frank and open conversation with thinking Chinese because they would be afraid to risk the danger of being seen in the company of a foreigner. Although frequently “Manchukuo” officials are met in a social way, these people are either renegades or mere figure-heads, and a frank expression of opinion from them would not be forthcoming even if one had the temerity to embarrass them with questions. The local Chinese language press, of course, is useless, as it is completely owned by Japanese, and under military censorship. There is not a single inch of printed material which is free, directly or indirectly, from Japanese propaganda.
From such contacts as have been possible, however, it has been disclosed that the native population almost unanimously would welcome the return of Chinese control. This is in spite of increasingly favorable economic conditions, a stable currency, perhaps a lessening of extortion on the part of officials, and a uniform rate of taxation. It is natural that the rural population should welcome the return of the Chinese, for not only have the farmers been the last to benefit by the “improvements”, but they have received brutal and soul-killing treatment far in excess of the city dwellers. Their farms have been destroyed and they have been forced into concentration areas, as part of the drive against outlaws; in many cases they have been driven off their farms, or have received but a fraction of their value to accommodate Korean and Japanese immigrants; their traditional cash crop, poppy, has been made illegal except in a few areas; and the 1930–34 economic depression in Manchuria was intensified because of the chaotic conditions which prevailed, and in their ignorance the farmers are apt to blame the Japanese for all the misfortunes which have befallen them.
Most important of all, of course, is the inherent hatred any race has for alien dominance. This has been noticed in many parts of the world, where the rules frequently were more tactful with the native population than has been the case in Manchuria. This dominance involves a loss of “face” which is almost insupportable, and which causes even the relatively well-to-do city merchants to look with longing for the return of a government of their own kind, even though they have received some economic benefits from the present regime and have not suffered the extreme hardships of their compatriots on the farms.
If the recent coup in Sian should lead to extensive Sino-Japanese hostilities, however, there is no reason to suppose that the present authorities would experience any particular difficulties with the population. For one thing, the people are to a large extent disarmed, and [Page 436] have not the means to procure weapons. For another, there is no leader with sufficient initiative, funds, or backing. Finally, the Chinese are notoriously apathetic to matters political and military, which, coupled with the fear of the efficiently organized system of secret police whose activities would undoubtedly be redoubled, would in all likelihood preclude the possibility of a serious uprising.
The greatest trouble would probably come from so-called bandits who are in reality patriotic Chinese in touch with Nanking or communists in touch with the U. S. S. R. The activities of these bands would in all probability increase, and perhaps many recruits would join them. Only recently one such band, numbering about 400 (according to official report) captured the town of Foshan, on the Amur north of Chiamussu, and was not dislodged for a week. It is hardly likely, however, that such bands would prove a serious menace in the rear to Japanese operations in China, although sporadic raids would doubtless continue and lawlessness as a whole increase. The possibility of an increase in covert Soviet assistance to these bands would be offset by the undoubted disappearance of assistance from China which is coming at the present time.
The situation in the event the U. S. S. R. should abandon neutrality is another question, beyond the scope of this report. The Chinese population, if left to its own devices, would not be likely to be a serious menace to the Japanese, at least in north Manchuria.
Respectfully yours,
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul at Harbin in his despatch No. 451, December 18; received February 19, 1937.↩