793.94/8481
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to
the Secretary of State
No. 277
Nanking, December 10, 1936.
[Received
January 4, 1937.]
Sir: I have the honor to transmit a
self-explanatory memorandum of conversation which I held on December 3,
1936, with Mr. Suma, Japanese Consul General and First Secretary of
Embassy in Nanking.
The Department’s attention will doubtless be drawn to Mr. Suma’s
statement to the effect that until recently the Chinese and Japanese
negotiators had found themselves ninety per cent in material agreement
in regard to the questions under discussion. I may observe in this
connection that possibly Mr. Suma was able to envisage agreement on
ninety per cent of the total number of points under discussion, counting
all minor points, but there has at no time appeared any evidence
indicating even a remote understanding as regards the several vital
matters at issue. This statement by Mr. Suma may have been dictated by a
desire to make it appear that the breakdown in negotiations resulted
from a sudden reversal of position on the part of China. It will be
recalled that the recent incident which took place when the Chinese
Minister for Foreign Affairs refused to accept an Aide-Mémoire from the Japanese Ambassador, was explained,
according to the Chinese version, by the assertion that the Aide-Mémoire represented the Chinese Foreign
Minister as having gone further than he could or would admit, in meeting
the Japanese point of view.
Mr. Suma struck what to me was a surprising note in his statement that he
had long entertained the thought that Japan and the United States should
do something to bring about political stability in the Pacific. It will
be observed that he coupled this remark with the statement that he had
recently, during his visit to Japan, had occasion to discover that the
same thought was in the minds of “a number of very important people in
Japan.”
Mr. Suma’s observations suggest the possibility that there may be a
growing tendency in Japanese official circles to seek American
cooperation and understanding, as the means toward a breathing space,
until such time as she is more sure of herself than at present.
Respectfully yours,
[Page 411]
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Ambassador in China (Johnson)
Nanking, December 3, 1936.
Mr. Y. Suma, Consul General and First Secretary of the Japanese
Embassy, called, and in the course of conversation he remarked that
the situation between China and Japan had not materially improved.
He stated that during the last month or so he had noticed a distinct
change for the worse in the attitude of the Chinese toward the
Japanese, and that even the soldiers and officers of General
Chiang’s own troops were now urging a more anti-Japanese attitude.
He ascribed this to several causes, among which he gave first place
to the suspicions raised in China by the Japanese-German agreement
recently signed in Berlin; but he also mentioned the Suiyuan
situation which he described as very serious and very embarrassing
to Japan.
He stated that the Japanese Ambassador had had seven or eight
meetings with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that he and
other members of the staff had had many meetings with the Chinese,
and he could say that up to recently they had found themselves
ninety per cent in material agreement in regard to the questions
under discussion. However, the Chinese were now hesitating going any
further in the matter because of the complications above referred
to. He said they were now awaiting the report of an officer who had
been sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Suiyuan to
investigate the situation on the spot.
With reference to the agreement between Germany and Japan calling for
cooperation against the Comintern, Mr. Suma stated that this had
been negotiated and signed in Berlin. From the way he referred to it
I inferred that he felt the agreement had complicated matters very
much for Japan here in China, for he stated that, although the
Japanese Foreign Office had made a very positive statement to the
effect that Japan would alone take steps to meet any threat from the
Comintern, the Chinese seemed to be very suspicious. In this
connection he also mentioned the Italian-Japanese agreement.
Referring to the Suiyuan situation, he stated that this was very
serious; that, whereas Chiang Kai-shek had not made up his mind in
regard to the matter, he was being urged by a considerable part of
his supporters to send the national forces now at Suiyuan into
Chahar. He said that if these forces went into Chahar the situation
would become most difficult.
Mr. Suma’s attitude seemed to be pessimistic. After a pause he
branched out upon a line which, for him in his conversations with
me, was very strange, and maybe significant. He said that on his
recent visit to Tokyo, whither he had gone for the purpose of making
a report to the Cabinet Council on Chinese conditions, with
particular reference
[Page 412]
to
their negotiations, he had had opportunity to talk with a number of
very important people in Japan, during which conversations he had
discovered that there was a great deal of sentiment in favor of an
idea which he had long held. This idea was one which he had had in
mind when he was in the Foreign Office and had charge of American
affairs. Briefly put, his idea was that the very bad situation in
the Pacific and in Asia should be stabilized, and he thought that
America should do something to bring about such stabilization. He
mentioned the League as a product of American idealists, and the
fact that America had withdrawn; stated that he thought America and
Japan might find it possible by some very simple agreement to
stabilize the situation; referred to the Lansing–Ishii notes86 as an example
of what he had in mind; mentioned the Pacific, the Philippines, as
the area which he believes will be covered. He was careful to state
that these were his personal thoughts and that he was astonished
that the higher authorities in Tokyo were not laboring to accomplish
something along these lines, and asked what my personal opinion
was.
I stated that I felt sure the United States wished to live at peace
with all of its neighbors; that it sought only their friendship and
good will, being prepared to give its friendship and good will in
return. I remarked that the stabilization of the situation in the
East and in the Pacific by an arrangement such as Mr. Suma had in
mind might be a very complicated matter. I referred to the fact that
attached to the naval agreement87 there was a four-power arrangement88 under which the
signatory powers, which included Japan and the United States, agreed
to consult one another about their mutual interests (in their
insular possessions) in the Pacific area. I stated that I was in
some doubt as to the present status of the naval agreement and those
agreements ancillary thereto, but that I thought they offered the
approach necessary. They were at least recorded efforts to do the
very thing which Mr. Suma presumably had in mind. I said that
doubtless a great deal would have to be discussed preliminary to any
stabilizing understanding. Mr. Suma agreed.
The conversation then dwindled off and he made his departure, but I
was somewhat puzzled by his approach. He left me feeling that the
Japanese are not as sure of themselves as they have seemed to be,
and that there appear to have been in official circles discussions
of a possibility of Japan enlisting American support for an
understanding which would establish the status
quo as Japan had succeeded in building it up, thus giving
her breathing space for a time.
