893.01 Inner Mongolia/84: Telegram
The First Secretary of Embassy in China (Merrell) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:50 p.m.]
492. Embassy’s 429, September 1, 2 p.m. Reports appearing in the Chinese press for the past few days indicate a possible renewal of warlike activities on the Chahar-Suiyuan border. According to this information, a conference began at Chapsur on October 5 between the important Chahar military leaders Teh Wang, Pao Yueh Ching, Li Shou Hsin, Wang Ying and others, in regard to important questions affecting Chahar and Suiyuan. Previous reports alleged that an airdrome and a wireless station have recently been established under Japanese initiative and control at Tingyuanying, northwest of Ninghsia, but that a similar project at Paotow was halted under pressure from Fu Tso Yi, Suiyuan Chairman, and the interested Japanese forced to withdraw to Kalgan. The current press reports now allege that additional military forces, presumably Mongol or Manchukuo in complexion, have moved into Chahar from Jehol, and that [Page 349] Wang Ying’s units at Shangtu have been strengthened in numbers and in addition furnished with four airplanes and four tanks; minor clashes are stated in the press to have been occurring in the past few days between these troops and the regular Suiyuan forces on the Chahar–Suiyuan border, and more important developments are alleged to be impending.
The Shanghai Shenpao of October 5 in a lengthy analysis of the current Sino-Japanese situation considers the political status of North China to be one point of focus, with the Japanese objective being the detachment of the five northern provinces from the authority of the National Government. The newspapers believe that overt action will temporarily be withheld pending the conclusion of the conversations between Chiang Kai Shek and Kawagoe, but that the Japanese will appeal to force if necessary to achieve their ends in Hopei, where the expulsion of the 29th Army is desired, and in Suiyuan; the force applied would so far as possible wear a Chinese aspect to avoid unfavorable reaction in China and abroad. The newspapers conclude, however, that the spirit of the troops of the 29th Army and the close relationship between Suiyuan and Shansi, qualified as these factors would inevitably be by the character of the National Government’s policy, put substantial difficulties in the way of the Japanese program in North China. This supposition is supported by a report obtained by the Consulate General at Tientsin from a source having connections in Inner Mongolia to the effect that the Silingol Mongols and those from the west are opposing the present forward move in Suiyuan, and that any fighting will have to be done with Jehol or other Manchukuo Mongols or by “bandit” Chinese groups.
The Embassy considers that (1) the potentialities of the Suiyuan situation may largely be viewed as a threat which the Japanese side will use in the present negotiations at Nanking, (2) important developments will probably be postponed pending the reaching of an agreement or a breakdown in the negotiations, but that a “demonstration” may be staged in an effort to influence those negotiations, and (3) in the event of such breakdown, the Suiyuan situation may logically be expected to take on a more threatening aspect.
By mail to Tokyo.