793.94/7590
Memorandum by the Ambassador in China (Johnson)46
Sir Frederick Leith-Ross asked me to come to see him, and I found him in Room 624, Cathay Mansions, with the British Ambassador.47 Leith-Ross began by saying that he wanted to discuss the political [Page 430] situation, which, after all, was in our province, although it had become inextricably connected with the financial situation with which he was particularly interested. He asked us both what we thought of the situation. The British Ambassador stated that it was very difficult to foresee; personally, he was convinced that the Japanese Government would not wish to use forceful means. I told them both that I thought the situation was a very serious one; that I was convinced in my own mind that, whatever the Japanese Government might think, the military leaders who were now controlling Japan’s destiny had set out upon a policy which was intended to eliminate every vestige of western influence in the political life of Asia, and that I believed this policy would be consistently, persistently, and ruthlessly pursued until it had been accomplished or until some force hitherto unseen had robbed the military of their present position of influence and their momentum. Leith-Ross and Cadogan agreed with my opinion. I stated that I had been informed in Nanking by an authority which I trusted (and not by the Foreign Office) that prior to Chiang Tso-pin’s departure from Tokyo he had had a conversation or conversations with Hirota, who had outlined to him three principles which the four ministries of the Japanese Government chiefly concerned agreed should underlie Japan’s policy toward China; that these principles were: (1) China must abandon the policy of playing one foreign nation against another; (2) arrangements must be made for free intercourse between the peoples of China and “Manchukuo”; (3) there must be cooperation or an alliance between China and Japan for the suppression of communistic influences in Asia. I stated that my information led me to believe that the Chinese Government was not opposed to these principles as principles, but that they were insisting on being treated as a sovereign power, and they asked the Japanese to implement these principles by laying down a concrete proposal setting forth in detail the manner in which the principles should be carried out, but that they believed that although the four ministries of the Japanese Government were in agreement in regard to these principles there was no agreement between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Japanese military as to how the principles should be carried out in their details. Sir Alexander interposed to say that he did not believe that the Japanese military wanted to put any concrete proposals before the Chinese. They wanted to leave the matter in the broadest terms possible in order that their hands might be free.
I stated that I was convinced that the Japanese military were exceedingly angered by the Chinese decree nationalizing silver and that they were convinced that this decree would not have been issued nor the step taken if they had not been given or promised a loan by Great [Page 431] Britain and/or by the United States. Sir Alexander stated that this was apparently the case although he believed that Ariyoshi quite understood that no loan had been given or promised. I said that I did not believe that Mr. Ariyoshi’s convictions counted very much in this situation. Sir Alexander agreed with this.
I stated that now, of course, it was very uncertain what the next move would be. The Japanese military were trying to force the Chinese leaders in north China to declare north China semi-autonomous, but that my information was that the Chinese were hesitating and proving themselves less tractable to this idea than the Japanese had hoped. I said that I felt quite certain that Chinese leaders had observed with interest the train of events in Europe in regard to the imposition of sanctions by the League and that they had observed with equal interest the proclamation of neutrality by the United States in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute,48 and that it was within the realm of possibility that the Chinese might call for a showdown on the part of the Japanese and force the Japanese to act, believing that if the Japanese would take forceful measures, amounting to an invasion of Chinese soil and an armed clash between the Chinese soldiers and the Japanese, they would be able to present a problem in all respects similar to the Ethiopian problem, with the expectation that the world would react in a similar way. Sir Alexander stated that in an interview which he had had with Chiang Kai-shek he had been subjected to a series of questions regarding the League’s attitude in the Ethiopian matter, indicating a very live interest there, and he was prepared to agree with my analysis.
Sir Alexander stated that he was leaving for Peiping this afternoon. Sir Frederick said that in a few days he was going to Tientsin to inquire into the currency situation there and would then go to Peiping.
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 119, December 6; received December 30.↩
- Sir Alexander Cadogan.↩
- See vol. i, pp. 594 ff.↩