Office of the Historian

893.6363 Manchuria/93: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, November 27, 1934—6 p.m.
[Received November 27—2:15 p.m.]

262. Department’s 193, November 23, 7 p.m., query (c).

1.
The Embassy has kept all of the Department’s instructions concerning the oil monopoly in Manchuria and the Japanese Petroleum Control Law constantly in mind, clearly understands the Department’s views and policy and has endeavored to reflect the Department’s attitude when appropriate occasion has arisen.
2.
In the same way the Embassy feels that it need not repeat the various factors and considerations already brought to the attention of the Department in previous telegrams and despatches.
3.
In the light of all circumstances now known to the Embassy I believe that a further American démarche similar to that made by Clive on November 24 is desirable for the following reasons:
(a)
Failure to continue our representations in step with the British would probably convey both to the Japanese and the British the impression that we are weakening in the face of Japan’s determined attitude.
(b)
Renewed representations would give concrete evidence at least of our own willingness to maintain a united front while awaiting further initiative by the British and Dutch Governments.
(c)
Hitherto our representations have been informal and our communications (July 7 and August 3163) were marked “informal memorandum”. Since these informal representations have apparently yielded no concrete results it would be a logical step now to follow them up with formal representations either by a signed note or by an aide-mémoire or memorandum conveyed by a covering note as was done by the British on August 21 and November 24. In each case the British communications have antedated ours.
(d)
A formal and firmly worded recapitulation of the various points already advanced, with the possible addition of a clause similar to the concluding clause of the last British aide-mémoire (see paragraph 6 of my 260, November 23 [24], 11 p.m.64) and of any further arguments which suggest themselves to the Department, would tend to mobilize and emphasize our whole case.
4.
It is impossible to predict the practical effect, if any, on the Japanese of such a third démarche. Clive seemed to think that [Page 769] Hirota was deeply impressed by his representations on November 24 and especially by his oral allusion to Japanese good faith.
5.
The fact should nevertheless be borne in mind that repeated diplomatic representations unsupported by current or eventual practical measures tend to lower American prestige in the eyes of the Japanese. They believe that American protests on almost any issue can safely be disregarded. The nature of the replies already made to our representations in the Manchuria oil monopoly indicates no inclination on the part of the Japanese to give serious consideration to our views and legitimate rights and interests.
6.
The outcome of the present issue is exceedingly important not only intrinsically but as a matter of broad principle and of American prestige and as influencing the whole future trend of our commercial interests in the Far East.
7.
While it is true that the British-Dutch distribution of refined oil products in Japan is greater than the American, I am reliably informed that in Manchuria the American sales of refined products are approximately double those of the British-Dutch interests (Standard-Vacuum 35 percent, Texas 20 percent, Shell 25 percent, others 20 percent).
8.
Oil is the weakest point in the Japanese defensive and economic structure. I am informed by our Naval Attaché that there exists a powerful undercurrent of fear among the Japanese that their supplies of oil might be interfered with as an eventual result of the present oil legislation in Japan and Manchuria.
9.
The considerations set forth above should be read in the light of the Department’s telegram 184, October 31, 7 p.m., and should not be interpreted as taking issue in any way with the views and policy set forth in that and other instructions from the Department which from the outset of this issue have been clear and consistent.
Grew
  1. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, pp. 130 and 133.↩
  2. Not printed.↩