893.6363 Manchuria/87: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 24—12:45 p.m.]
259. My [254,] November 22, 8 p.m. My British colleague made representations this morning to the Minister for Foreign Affairs under instructions, presenting an aide-mémoire covered by an official transmitting [Page 767] note. Résumé of aide-mémoire will be cabled to the Department separately. Clive informs me that he brought out the following further points orally.
- 1.
- British Government regards oil monopoly in Manchuria as an extremely serious matter involving principle of open door. If the oil monopoly is allowed to materialize other monopolies may follow effectually closing the door to other commodities.
- 2.
- Sir John Simon62 is faced with the possible necessity of making a full public report on the situation setting forth all the facts which would have a deplorable effect on British public opinion because it has become a question of Japanese good faith.
- 3.
- “Manchukuo” has given gratuitous and unconditional assurances that the open door and all treaty rights would be maintained. It is absurd to contend that the failure of the British Government to recognize “Manchukuo” has invalidated these assurances. The question of recognition has not arisen. If the British Government were to recognize “Manchukuo” it would mean the wrecking of the League of Nations. The British Government has no intention of taking such a step.
- 4.
- “Manchukuo” would not dare to proceed with such a step as the oil monopoly if advised against it by the Japanese Government. Since the British Government cannot deal officially with “Manchukuo”, it expects the Japanese Government, in view of its special relations with “Manchukuo”, to intervene.
Hirota at first replied that the case was closed, that no treaties had been violated either by Japan or by “Manchukuo” and that nothing could be done by the Japanese Government to obstruct the projected monopoly. Clive, however, continued to press the case and received the impression that Hirota was impressed by the strong stand taken by the British Government. Hirota observed that the British and American Governments were tending to link up the oil monopoly with the naval conversations. Clive said he could not answer for the United States but he could state definitely that no responsible British Cabinet officer and no responsible organ of the British press had attempted to confuse the two issues. Clive stated that in view of the delicacy of the naval conversations it was very surprising that the oil monopoly should have been set in motion at this time.
End of résumé of conversation between Clive and Hirota.
Clive inquired what we propose to do in case the Japanese Government remains intransigent and the oil monopoly goes into effect presumably next February. He thinks that it would be a very serious matter to limit ourselves to mere representations if they prove ineffectual and that the whole future trend of Japanese policy and action in the Far East may depend largely on the outcome of this particular issue. I made clear to him our attitude as conveyed in the various instructions which I have received from the Department.
[Page 768]Department’s 193, November 23, 7 p.m., which is extremely helpful, has just been decoded but is still somewhat garbled. This telegram answers query (b). I shall reply to query (c) shortly after further thought.
- British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.↩