Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, General, the British Commonwealth, Volume I

500.A15A4 General Committee/932: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, May 30, 1934—8 p.m.
[Received 10:19 p.m.]

854. 1. Simon’s primary concern in his speech⁷⁰ at the General Commission this afternoon dealt with the basic problem of reconciling French and German divergences. To England the only possible bridge between the two theses of German rearmament is provided in the modifications to the draft convention contained in the British memorandum of January 29th. This view he felt had been strengthened by conclusions of Article [April] 14 memorandum⁷¹ of the Danish, Spanish, Swiss, Norwegian and Swedish delegations. As far as security is concerned the British draft convention he explained dealt with it on lines along which it might hope for the sympathy and cooperation of the United States. Beyond this he indicated that his Government was not prepared to go. In so far as Soviet’s suggestion of yesterday⁷² was concerned he pointed out that no instrument of security could be contemplated until a disarmament agreement had been reached and could not accept the suggestion that the Conference be transformed into a conference for devising plans for security on the basis that no disarmament is possible. Furthermore the value of security pacts in the British opinion depended upon the certainty of their positive performance and he considered therefore that the Treaty of Locarno⁷³ with its limited undertakings to which the British Government has promised to adhere is of higher value than a “more unlimited and world wide assurance”. As far as the Disarmament Conference was concerned he stated that the British Government could not commit itself to an indefinite continuance of vague and inconclusive discussions; first, because it would inflict injury upon the League and the whole conception of effective international efforts and second, because governments could not be debarred from dealing with new conditions and new committees merely because the conference was still in being.

2. While expressing a hope that a solution of the basic problems could be found Simon concluded with reference to protocols concerning checking warfare, budgetary publicity and the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission which would be prepared immediately. Furthermore his Government was prepared to deal with the manufacture of and traffic in arms and as a first step suggested that the 1925 convention should at once be ratified and be brought into force by all states.

3. In the firmest possible terms Barthou replied⁷⁴ directly and at times extremely sarcastically to Simon defining the French position as admitting no German rearmament and as relying upon the Conference to continue its work to achieve a reduction of armaments accompanied by the necessary guarantees of security. He considered that the British plan did not answer present conditions because Germany’s departure had rendered agreement upon that basis impossible. Although Simon had considered the British plan the only possible solution Barthou could not accept these “illusions of paternity.” Not only had Mussolini fathered a scheme but France had done so also, remaining faithful to its position taken at the beginning of the Conference. This position was based upon article 8 of the Covenant and the preamble to part V of the Treaty of Versailles⁷⁵ as subsequently interpreted by French memoranda notably those of January 1st and April 17th. A solution of the problem of security which had been furthered by Litvinoff’s declaration yesterday was essential and he considered it would be difficult for anyone not to go beyond the British concept. Negotiations with England as to the guarantees of execution necessary to gain French adherence to the British revisions of January 29th he explained had been broken off because of the German military preparations as evidenced in its increased budgets. The theme of German responsibility for which he could find no excuse was predominant in this section of his speech. He particularly made the point which is hard to answer that it is not right to put a premium on Germany’s unjustifiable action in leaving the Conference and beginning actively to rearm in the midst of negotiations.

Davis

70. Minutes of the General Commission, vol. iii, pp. 661–665.
71. Ibid., pp. 676–677.
72. Ibid., pp. 657–661.
73. League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. liv, p. 289.
74. Minutes of the General Commission, vol. iii, pp. 665–670.
75. Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1910–1923 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923), vol iii, p. 3329.