500.A15A5/329: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 13—3:49 p.m.]
71. In a conversation with MacDonald alone this morning I set forth and urged, as strongly as I could, the arguments and point of view set forth in your various instructions, and particularly the first part of your No. 49, December 8, 2 [3] p.m. While this was to a large extent a repetition of what I had previously said to him, I think it made some impression, although I cannot say it convinced him. He repeated that they had no intention of giving the Japanese anything to take home other than an understanding of what they would have to do later if they wished to get an agreement, and that would certainly not be a victory for the Militarists. He said they had made known to the Japanese very definitely that they would not consider any alteration in substance of the present treaties; and that if they were not prepared to recede from their position, there was nothing further to discuss. The Japanese then, without agreeing definitely to recede, said they would be glad to explore the possibilities of agreement on that basis. Having once agreed to accept as the basis of discussion what was stipulated by the British they must in MacDonald’s opinion either recede completely from their original position or break off the conversations themselves and take the onus.
I told him I thought they were running the risk of getting themselves in a jam by not taking the position with us that termination of the Washington Treaty must necessarily terminate the conversations; and that they should inform the Japanese that for reasons which are obvious, the conversations cannot continue after denunciation and that, if they wish to avoid terminating the conversations, they must get through before denunciation.
MacDonald said he did not think there was much more to do with the Japanese as soon as they get the reply that is awaited and that it [Page 398] should be perfectly possible to get through before denunciation so that we could all go home. I told him the Japanese reply would either be delayed or so inconclusive as to require further communication with Tokyo and that I suspected their purpose was to keep the matter open until after denunciation in such a way that the British would feel they must continue, which, in my opinion, was the crux of the problem and one of vital importance. He seemed somewhat disconcerted and said they were not apt to be so easily fooled and should be able to finish before denunciation but that he would talk this over and have Craigie see me.