500.A15A5/324: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 12—8:05 p.m.]
70. For the President and the Secretary. MacDonald and Simon being still immersed in the debate on the India matter, Craigie came to see me today at Simon’s request, to inform me of the status of the British conversations with the Japanese. He confirmed the informal information previously reported in my 68, December 11, 2 p.m. The only additional point brought out was that the treaty would include a stipulation to the effect that no alteration would be made in the annexed building programs without previous consultation and 12 months notice. He emphasized again that there was no question of arriving at any agreement now, but merely an effort to explore a possible basis for a future meeting or conference in 1935.
He added that while the discussions were in effect on the basis of no actual change from the present principles—except as to form—it was not possible for the Japanese openly to admit that.
Craigie informed me that the Japanese, who have now reported to their Government and asked for authority to pursue the conversations further along the above lines, will probably not get a reply for several days. The British are endeavoring to take advantage of the apparently more conciliatory attitude on the part of the Japanese and thus to consolidate the gains and yet not go contrary to the American point of view which, in compliance with your instructions, I set forth in the meeting with the British on December 4th39 and subsequently.
If Matsudaira’s instructions are favorable, the British will then desire to discuss the matter more fully with us and, if agreeable to us, arrange for informal discussions between Admirals Standley, Chatfield, and Yamamoto.
In order to meet our views and at the same time not to miss any opportunity afforded by the apparently more reasonable attitude of the [Page 396] Japanese Delegation, the British, according to Craigie, have been considering two alternative courses:
The first is that the conversations might be formally adjourned on Friday the 14th in order that we might sail on the 15th, such adjournment being explained on the grounds of permitting a cessation of work for the holidays. When I asked whether this would mean that the Japanese would also go home, Craigie said he thought they might not have received the Japanese reply by then, and that Yamamoto might thus have to remain for a week or two longer for informal conversations, in case the Japanese are still showing a disposition to recede from their previous position. I restated our view that as a matter of tactics as well as principle, denunciation should definitely terminate the present conversations, both formally and informally and that for Yamamoto to remain here in conversations after we had left and after denunciation, would arouse suspicion and put a strain on Anglo-American understanding. Therefore, the Japanese should either hasten their decisions or postpone denunciation.
This brought Craigie to the alternative suggestion of their pressing the Japanese Government to postpone denunciation until the 30th, and of formally adjourning the conversations on the 20th, as the Prime Minister and Sir John are leaving for the holidays on the 21st. This would give us several more days in which to wind up our work, and in which the Japanese could communicate further, if necessary, with Tokyo. Informal conversations could thus be continued thereafter until we sail on the 29th, or until Japanese denunciation, if such denunciation should precede our departure. Matsudaira has indicated to the British that he does not in any case see how denunciation could come before the 23rd or 24th as the Privy Council does not meet until the 20th.
I emphasized to Craigie that when we adjourn, no date should in our opinion be fixed for any future meetings, but that it might be agreed that the British having initiated the present conversations should continue their efforts through diplomatic channels, and if as a result of this they should feel that there was a sufficient basis of accord to promise success, they might arrange for a full five power conference. Craigie said he thought the British would agree to this, except that there was a question whether further preparatory conversations would not, in any event, have to take place within 3 or 4 months. I told him that we would certainly not be willing to get into any more bilateral conversations, and that we thought it better to meet again only in full conference, in case of any meeting at all.
I am convinced from what Craigie told me that in their conversations with the Japanese the British have been holding to the position we have taken of not agreeing to any change of substance in the present basis and principles of limitation. They have, so Craigie informed me, impressed upon the Japanese that there is no real difference between the United States and England and that while there exists as yet no common front such a front might develop if the Japanese [Page 397] remain unreasonable, which he felt had greatly influenced them to take a more conciliatory attitude. Craigie added that upon denunciation the British planned to send a very vigorous note to the Japanese Government which would be published and which would state in substance that the British regarded Japan’s action as a very serious matter.
Craigie requested that what he had told me should be treated in the strictest confidence and communicated only to you.