861.77 Chinese Eastern/1216

Memorandum by the Minister in China (Johnson) of a Conversation With the Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in China (Barkov)56

Mr. Barkov called. He said that he had just returned from Nanking, to which place he had made a hurried visit. He asked me what I thought of the local situation. I told him that I was still unable to say with any certainty, but I thought that fighting had stopped.

Mr. Barkov stated that the Chinese continued to protest against the probable sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway by Soviet Russia to Manchukuo. He said that he felt the Chinese did not understand the situation here in the East. He said that in the war [sic] which the Soviets have with Japan the responsibility of the Soviets is very great. He laid particular emphasis on the fact that the President of the United States had addressed his communication on world peace directly to the President of Soviet Russia,57 and Soviet Russia’s favorable reply to this,58 pointing out that it marked a rapprochement of great importance and an indication of an understanding beginning to be reached among the powers on the general question of world peace. He said that this fact made Russia’s responsibility in the matter of world peace all the heavier, as he was confident that any attempt on the part of Soviet Russia to resist by force Japanese activities in Manchukuo would precipitate a world conflict in eastern Asia. He thought the Chinese did not understand this, nor did they understand that China would be the greatest sufferer. It was Soviet Russia’s policy to keep the peace and to that end it was necessary for them to get out of Manchuria, for to stay in Manchuria now meant unavoidable trouble and complications with Japan.

[Page 347]

As regards China, the sale of the Railway to Manchukuo would be of advantage to China, for if China regains control over Manchuria she will regain her control over the Chinese Eastern Railway, and without cost to herself.

He stated that the situation here in the East according to his belief was extremely delicate and portentous, as without doubt it was Japan’s policy to endeavor to change the Government in China and substitute for the Kuomintang Government a government subservient to Japanese dictation. It was extremely difficult for any one to foresee the limits to which Japan’s policy might carry her, and therefore it was all the more necessary that Europe and America including Soviet Russia understand the situation and find some basis for world peace.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
  1. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in China in his despatch No. 2130, May 29; received June 24.
  2. See message of May 16, 1933, printed in vol. i, section on the Disarmament Conference.
  3. Department of State, Press Releases, May 19, 1933, p. 359.