793.94/5879

The Consul General at Nanking (Peck) to the Secretary of State

No. D–417

Sir: I have the honor to enclose herewith a Memorandum prepared by me under date of January 9, 1933, containing an account given orally by Lieutenant H. L. Boatner, U.S.A., of the Military Attaché’s office and now on temporary detail in Nanking, of a conversation held by him on January 8, 1933, with Dr. Yu, Secretary General of the Chinese General Staff. Dr. Yu stated that he is a grandson of Marquis Tseng Kuo-fan and a son of the Marquis Tseng who was Chinese Minister to Great Britain. In spite of his military duties Dr. Yu has not received a military education, but obtained his doctor’s degree at Harvard after writing a thesis on mathematics.

Dr. Yu’s object in talking with Lieutenant Boatner was to explore the possibilities which may exist for obtaining from the American Government for the Chinese Government technical, material and financial assistance in China’s present military resistance to Japan.

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He argued, in effect, that Japan is a potential enemy of the United States and that it would be to the advantage of the United States to assist China to prevent Japan from strengthening herself by expansion on the Asiatic mainland. The same sort of argument was made to one or two officers of the American Legation last summer by Dr. H. H. Kung,56 who is now on a special mission in the United States.

I may add that the view seems widely held among Chinese that the alleged American hegemony of the countries bordering the Pacific Ocean will be lost if Japan succeeds in gaining a foothold on the continent of Asia. The corollary to this view is, of course, that the outcome of the present struggle is as vital to the United States as to China and that it would be easier and cheaper for the United States to assist China to frustrate Japan’s expansionist schemes, than to fight Japan later on when her strength has been immeasurably increased through obtaining control of the financial and material resources of Manchuria. Some Chinese explain the lack of response to this reasoning on the part of the United States by saying that the American people are ignorant in regard to Asiatic international politics, are preoccupied with economic difficulties and ambitions, and, rather paradoxically, are characterized by an idealistic mentality which refuses to recognize and face the predatory imperialistic ambitions of Japan.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck
[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Consul General at Nanking (Peck)

Dr. Yu called upon Lt. Boatner on January 8th and stated that he was the Secretary General of the General Staff of the Chinese Army, and as such is directly under the orders of General Chiang Kai-shek, who is Chief of the General Staff.

According to the account of the conversation given to Mr. Peck, Counselor of the American Legation, by Lt. Boatner on the morning of January 9th, what follows is the general purport of what was said:

Dr. Yu observed that it was obvious that Japan is a potential future enemy of the United States. It is Japan’s object to obtain a political and military foothold on the Asiatic continent, her present objective being Manchuria and China. If Japan succeeds in obtaining this [Page 41] foothold on the mainland, she will be a much more formidable antagonist against the United States than she would be otherwise.

This being the case it would be to the interests of the United States to assist China to foil the attempt of Japan to expand on the continent, rather than to allow Japan to succeed in this attempt.

What China needs most are expert military advice and war matériel. Dr. Yu strongly advised that special officers of the American Army be sent to augment the staff of the American Military Attaché, with the duty of giving constructive advice to the Chinese high military command.

Dr. Yu was anxious to learn what the attitude of the American Government would be toward the supplying of munitions of war and of raw materials to be used for the manufacture of munitions in China. He remarked that the Chinese arsenals found it difficult to obtain adequate supplies of iron, copper, steel etc.

Dr. Yu observed that the expense which would be involved in obtaining adequate amounts of munitions and of raw material for use in fighting Japan successfully would be very great and he suggested, in line with his argument already quoted, that the American Government might be willing to take measures which would enable the Chinese Government to acquire munitions and raw materials on credit.

Dr. Yu said that it was no use for the Chinese Government to look to the German Government for assistance in these matters, in spite of the fact that the large number of German officers in Nanking seemed to indicate that there was some kind of rapprochement between the two countries in a military way. The German Government, in point of fact, constantly hampers the Chinese Government by making it difficult for China to purchase military equipment in Germany. All that China can expect from Germany is the opportunity to hire expert German advisers.

Another country to which China might naturally look for assistance in opposing Japan’s imperialistic policy is the Soviet Republic. It would, however, be very dangerous for China to accept assistance from the Soviet Government. The Communist influence in some Provinces, e.g., Kiangsi, is so strong that the Chinese Government is hardly able to eradicate it and the Government’s efforts in this direction would be made still more difficult if the Government were to accept assistance from the Soviet Government. China is too weak to accept great aid from Russia which might place China under the complete control of bolshevist influence.

Consequently, all the circumstances of the case lead the Chinese military authorities to look to the American Government for cooperation through the supply of expert military advisers and through [Page 42] making it possible for the military branch of the Chinese Government to obtain munitions and raw materials on credit.

Dr. Yu emphasized that his remarks to Lt. Boatner were made on his own initiative. He hoped that Lt. Boatner would not report the conversation they had had until he (Dr. Yu) had had an opportunity to sound the views of Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance, and General Chiang Kai-shek, Chief of the General Staff.

Lt. Boatner was mainly a listener in this conversation. In reply to direct questions, however, he told Dr. Yu that he thought that the policy of the American Government was directly opposed to any direct cooperation with China in China’s controversy with Japan in the form of sending military advisers, or in the shape of assisting China to obtain munitions and raw materials on credit. He advised Dr. Yu to consult Mr. Julean Arnold, American Commercial Attaché, in the matter of purchasing munitions and raw materials in the United States, since it was the specific duty of the Commercial Attaché to promote American trade with China. Lt. Boatner also advised that the Chinese Government negotiate with commercial firms for the purchase of its munitions and raw materials. Dr. Yu said that the Chinese military authorities did not wish to pursue this course, but wanted to deal with some American governmental department or direct with manufacturer, with an American military officer participating in all negotiations.

Dr. Yu explained, rather naively, that General Chiang Kai-shek, did not want to enter into any negotiations with American authorities until he had reason to know that such negotiations would succeed, for fear that failure would play into the hands of his political enemies. For this reason he insisted that the initiative in the matter must come from the American Government.

  1. State councilor of the National Government; special industrial commissioner to United States and Europe, 1932–33.