793.94/5982
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Castle)
The Japanese Ambassador said that he had nothing particular to say, that he just wanted to talk over the situation and ask some very indiscreet questions. I told him that I should have to use my own judgment as to whether I should answer his indiscreet questions.
He brought up first the question of the fleet in the Pacific and said that he had nothing further to say on that subject except that he was sorry to see that the fleet was remaining for another year in the Pacific. I reminded him that the Navy Department had said that this was done for purposes of economy, that this was a very real matter. He said that presumably, also, the Navy felt it was just as well to have the fleet in a disturbed area. I told him that the Navy naturally looked at all sides of a question and that if it felt the Pacific was the best place to have the fleet, it would certainly keep it there.
The Ambassador then went on to say that since the Shanhaikwan incident the League, particularly Great Britain, had taken a much more definite stand against Japan than it had taken before. I said this was quite true and reminded him that I had told him at the time that this act of Japan would inevitably worry the British, but that it seemed to me that the British attitude at the present time [Page 182] was based on the treaties which Japan had overridden. He said that he thought the small nations in the League were going altogether too far in their condemnation of Japan and that it was really absurd to make any demands now that the Japanese troops be withdrawn to the railway zone. I reminded the Ambassador that it was hardly fair to say that the present attitude of the League was merely the attitude of the small nations inasmuch as Great Britain and the others were presenting a united front.
The conversation then turned to some of the stories which were being published, for example, that Great Britain had offered us the use of the Singapore base. I told the Ambassador that if the Japanese military people ran wild and brought on war, it stood to reason that the British would give all the facilities at Singapore or anywhere else to the nations which were on the British side. He also spoke of the foolish story that this country had advanced a large sum of money on the security of the Chinese treasury. I told him that stories of this sort were not anywhere nearly as mischievous as stories being continually given out by the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office for the purpose of raising anti-American feeling in Japan. I cited Shiratori’s95 statement that large numbers of American officers were going to China to train the Chinese to fight against the Japanese, which stories the Ambassador knew were false and particularly his last story that there was a secret understanding and alliance between Russia, China and the United States. The Ambassador said that he thought that Shiratori’s outbursts were a great trial to Count Uchida and that he has never been able to understand why Shiratori was allowed to remain in the position he holds.
The Ambassador spoke of the probable advance on Jehol. He tried to defend this on the ground that Jehol had been incorporated into Manchuria by Chang-tso-lin96 and that the puppet state of Manchukuo (he used the word puppet himself) naturally would include all that had formerly been called Manchuria. He said he thought it was probably true that the Japanese military would order Chang Hsueh Liang97 to remove his troops from Jehol, in order to prevent fighting, that it was a peaceful move. I answered that the world would not consider it as a peaceful move, that if he was quoting history we could come down to very much more recent history by [Page 183] quoting the affirmation of Japan that Manchuria was Chinese territory, that if Manchuria was Chinese territory it was obvious that one part of it was also Chinese territory. The Ambassador admitted that history was a dangerous argument. He said that people took the Jehol situation altogether too seriously, that it was a great plain, very sparsely inhabitated and that the only purpose of taking it over from the Chinese was to prevent the revenue going to Chang Hsueh Liang to support his armies. I told him that if it was, as he said, a sparsely settled country, I saw no reason why Japan should be willing to incur the enmity of the whole world by attacking.
The Ambassador reminded me that I had said I did not see any immediate danger of an attack on Peiping. I told him that that statement remained true, but that it might not be true in the future if the Japanese were in control of Jehol and, therefore, only a few miles distant from Peiping. The Ambassador said that if he were defining Japanese policy he would make it very clear to the world that the Japanese would never interfere with China, taking the ground that in the north it ended at the Great Wall. I told him that, although that might be his policy, it, nevertheless, remained true that if at some future time the Japanese military got the idea that Chang Hsueh Liang was concentrating too many troops in Peiping they might consider an attack on Peiping necessary for the usual “self-protection.” The Ambassador admitted this was a danger. He said, however, he felt it was impossible to turn back the hands of the clock, that the vast population of Manchuria was ignorant and wanted only peace and a chance to work, that Manchuria had great resources, that Man-churian money was already at premium on account of the balance of trade and that if Japan could be let alone he felt that, with Japanese assistance, Manchukuo would become in ten years a model state, prosperous and hard working. He said that people claimed that the Japanese would close the door into Manchuria, that even if there were not cooperation with other nations, it will still be useful to the United States because the raw materials for goods sold by Japan in Manchuria all come from this country. He ended by saying that he hoped ten years from now we could compare notes as to what had happened. I told him that I hoped we could, but that I was afraid he was an optimist.