893.00/12291: Telegram
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 13—8:25 a.m.]
137. In view of the great complexity of China’s present national and international [relations?] and in order to assist the Department as much as may be possible in arriving at decisions in connection with our policy in the Far East, the following is intended to supplement the Legation’s political reports and current telegrams.
The position of the National Government in Nanking is in many respects an anomalous one. The Chief Executive Lin Sen is a mere figurehead and since department [departure?] of Wang Ching-wei85 last August dominant personalities are again Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong. The addition of Sun Fo86 as President of Executive [Legislative?] Yuan in December has partially restored a Nanking-Canton coalition but has not changed Canton’s aloofness. The Cantonese themselves are suffering from divided counsels and although reckless enough to endanger the nation they seem incapable of constituting themselves into an effective opposition.
Theoretically the majority of the Chinese accept the Central Government but in practice the Government is factional rather than national. [Page 171] It will necessarily be a long time before the Republic finds its feet because of the exceptional difficulty of establishing centralized rule over an almost inaccessible interior with a centuries old tradition of virtual local autonomy. Besides the Government is handicapped by an enormous illiterate and nonpolitical population the continuity of whose inherited traditions has given them certain habits of thought which makes adjustments to modern political life extremely difficult.
The Government, although originally established by the Kuomintang, has recently given little evidence of having a constructive mind of its own and has allowed affairs to drift more or less aimlessly, being paralyzed by the unwillingness of subordinate leaders in the party to yield to it the necessary responsibility.
Kuomintang has had a virtual monopoly of all political power as well as of the judiciary, education and the press. The prestige of the party is today at low ebb because orthodox leaders like Hu Han-min87 no longer cooperate and its educative role has been largely barren. The people have lost faith in it because it failed to take advantage of its exceptional opportunities and was unable to redeem its specious promises. Today Kuomintang is divided against itself and it is doubtful whether it will ever again wield the power which at one time gave it more importance even than the Government or the people. It cannot cling indefinitely to the old tutelage conception of its obligations although it may seek covertly to prolong life of the political machinery which gave it its dominant position in every phase of national activity.
The Central Government can maintain itself in power only so long as it controls a substantial portion of the various Chinese armies. China has today no real national army capable either of making effective the Government’s writ throughout the country or of effective resistance under unified control against a modern power despite the fact that over two million men are under arms. They are the tools of rival militarists who have repeatedly plunged the nation into civil war and whose most solemn pledges to support the National Government are usually worthless. This is causing a constantly shifting balance of power among the regional feudal-minded war lords such as occurred in Shantung and Szechuan within recent months and the usurpation of Nanking’s authority by collecting and retaining national revenues. Unless the present conflict with Japan has the effect of eliminating useless local leaders and of creating a national army the military incubus will continue to be one of China’s gravest problems. It is obvious that the armies should be removed from politics, diminished in numbers and increased in efficiency, but to find productive [Page 172] employment for large hordes of ill-disciplined, disbanded soldiers will not be easy.
Closely related to this question is the problem of communism and banditry not only because it takes loyal and disciplined troops to crush military power of the Reds but because both Communists and bandits are constantly being recruited from the unpaid and underfed mercenary soldiery which roams the countryside. Chiang Kai-shek has for several years been fighting Communists but it is only quite recently that the economic and agrarian character of the problem has been given attention. Famines, floods, civil wars and other misfortunes have driven millions of peasants to desperation. They are not only hungering for land but for food and fall therefore an easy prey to Communists’ propagandists who glibly promise relief from intolerable conditions. To what extent the recent resumption of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia will affect the semi-Sovietized areas in Central China it is impossible to predict.
The shadow of Bolshevism will lie over parts of China until a thoroughgoing program of rural economy has improved the lot of the masses and an efficient administration has produced a sense of security in the interior.
Despite these discouraging factors any impartial critic must admit that perceptible progress may be seen in certain directions and that when allowance has been made for the exceptional intricacy of the tasks confronting a National Government, crippled and impoverished by years of internecine strife, there is no ground for undue pessimism.
The admittedly transitory and provisional character of Kuomintang regime in itself explains many of its failures. It may confidently be expected that in time whatever dictatorship China may require will become less obtrusive and that the students and upper classes will take more and more intelligent interest in politics. Today the need of uniting all capable moderate elements and of having adequate financial resources for normal requirements is fully recognized. T. V. Soong has displayed great skill and caution in restoring confidence in China’s credit by balancing the budget at least in the sense that during the past year expenses have been met from revenues without resorting to further borrowing. Many old obligations are of course still in arrears but considering that a year ago Nanking’s borrowing capacity was completely exhausted and a financial breakdown seemed inevitable the results are reassuring.
China’s internal problems are sufficiently grave without international complications but it is possible that the long-drawn-out controversy with Japan since September 18, 1931 will at least serve to bring home to the Chinese a realization of their domestic weakness and disunity. The Kuomintang had been in the habit of repeating [Page 173] thoughtlessly such borrowed slogans as “liberation from the fetters of imperialistic powers” potent but misleading catchwords which have often caused foreign rights to be disregarded or to be left without adequate protection as a deliberate measure of policy. Although realizing now only too well that the use of such slogans and the excitement of the popular mind by agitation can be no substitute for an efficiently trained armed force under unified control for the maintenance and protection of China’s sovereign rights, there is at present no leadership bold enough to face popular indignation by publicly acknowledging this fact and compromising with Japan. The people therefore feel that China is very much the aggrieved party and that she has technically an unanswerable case because whatever her own misdeeds may have been Japan’s are greater in the sight of the world in that she has clearly violated the Covenant of the League, the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris.
It is, therefore, natural that China should want to use League to strengthen her position at home. The Chinese Government has acted with sensible moderation and the people, despite their hatred of Japan and repeated provocations, have not committed any excesses. Their disappointment at the League’s lack of firmness in dealing with the situation is consequently all the keener and they resent suggestion of direct negotiations with Japan. They demand just and fair settlement consistent with China’s dignity and this is impossible if Manchukuo, creature of Japanese militarism, is permitted to live and if flagrant instances of Japan’s ruthlessness as at Chinchow, Shanghai and now at Shanhaikwan are to be condoned. The atmosphere of suspense has undoubtedly caused a rising warlike temper in China and the people will no longer wait with folded arms for the impending invasion of Jehol or of China proper. The National Government is not wholly out of touch with popular opinion especially in matters of foreign policy and the leaders have been encouraged to make such military resistance as they can and they vaguely hope even to recover Manchuria by force. It is, therefore, likely that the whole controversy will become a trial of endurance between China and Japan which may last for years. The masses of the two peoples know surprisingly little of each other although the Japanese like to claim that they know China better than the Chinese themselves. So long as a state of strained relations exists it will be extremely difficult to find approaches which will bring these traditional enemies together even though they both realize that an understanding if not actual cooperation is essential for their welfare.
If the League fails in its attempt to reconcile conflicting policies and emotions it is extremely likely that China will turn to the United States for advice. It would be idle to pretend that the thought of [Page 174] possible hostilities between Japan and the United States has not occurred to the Chinese Government as a logical consequence of our policy to uphold the Paris Pact and the open door and to outlaw the fruits of armed aggression. Our traditional attitude of friendly helpfulness toward China and our important interests in the Far East have led China to hope that we will insist upon a strict construction of our so-called nonrecognition policy and the principle of consultation. While responsible leaders do not of course count on a rupture of relations between the United States and Japan there is evidence of a hope that in the event of a Sino-Japanese war American commitments as regards the territorial integrity of China would virtually oblige us to bring at least moral pressure to bear upon Japan and perhaps to take the lead in calling a conference to find a modus vivendi and to create machinery to deal with the practical difficulties. The United States has given the world to understand that it considers a breach of the peace the common concern of all nations and that public opinion must be the most powerful of all sanctions behind all international intercourse. There is, therefore, an indication of a feeling on the part of some Chinese leaders that we can hardly remain indifferent when not only China’s regeneration but the whole future stability of the world is at stake.
By mail to Tokyo.