Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1933, The Far East, Volume III

793.94 Commission/785: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, February 9, 1933—8 p.m.
[Received February 9—7:11 p.m.]

101. The following communiqué was issued after the meeting of the Committee of Nineteen this morning:

“The Committee of Nineteen considered this morning new proposals submitted by the Japanese delegation in regard to the draft resolution and declaration by the President which on December 15 last the Committee transmitted to the two parties as a possible basis of conciliation. As certain questions arose as to the exact scope of these suggestions the Committee, in order to remove any possible misunderstanding, decided to address a letter to the Japanese delegation asking it for more precise information as to its position regarding the seventh principle in the ninth chapter of the report of the Commission of Inquiry, the text of which is as follows (quotation omitted).

At the same time the Secretary-General was requested to call attention of the Japanese delegation verbally to the reports of continued military preparations and movements which the Committee considered would constitute an aggravation of the situation and endanger, if not frustrate, efforts for conciliation.

The drafting committee will meet this afternoon after the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference to continue its discussion of the report to be substituted [submitted] to the Committee of Nineteen”.

Following is résumé of Sweetser’s confidential report to me of discussion this morning in Committee of Nineteen regarding the new Japanese proposals.

Two important decisions were taken.

1. To send formal letter to Japanese in effort to remove any possible doubt that conciliation should be based on point 7 of chapter 9 of Lytton Report involving Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria.

2. To request Secretary-General to inform Matsuoka of Committee’s view that reported military operations in Jehol would render conciliation impossible.

A letter in above sense was despatched at once to Matsuoka and arrangements were made for interview with him this afternoon.

Drummond opened the meeting by giving an account of his interview with Matsuoka when latter presented new Japanese proposals. Matsuoka stressed that new proposals were based very largely on quotations from Lytton Report. He then outlined six very important concessions by Japan which he thought the Committee should fully appreciate:

1. Although Japan had originally made the strongest reservation to the application of article 15 to this dispute, Japan now agreed to the procedure under that article.

2. While Japan had also hitherto objected to mention of the Nine-Power Treaty, its inclusion was agreed to in the proposed resolution.

3. Although Japan had similarly made strong reservation at the time of the Assembly resolution of March 11, she now equally agreed to the mention of that resolution.

4. Although points 7 and 8 in chapter 9 of the Lytton Report had been wholly unacceptable to Japan, she had agreed to the inclusion of chapter 9 in the proposed resolution.

5. While hitherto Japan had held that only those powers having appreciable interest in the Far East should participate in conciliation she now agreed that this might be conducted by the Committee of Nineteen.

6. While previously Japan had pressed for omission of last paragraph of President’s declaration regarding present situation in Manchuria, she now agreed that the paragraph might remain although she wished it amended.

Matsuoka accordingly felt that Japan had accepted all essential principles of December 15 draft and that there now remained only the question of how to apply those principles. From Japan’s viewpoint the question of peace and order in Manchuria was of the most vital importance. There Japan could make no concession. It was her sincere feeling that given the disorder in China proper, a condition of chaos would develop in Manchuria upon a return of Chinese sovereignty. The Chinese would undoubtedly abuse the rights thus given them and the situation would return to that of September, 1931, with an almost inevitable recurrence of the same difficulty. Finally, Matsuoka expressed the view that there was very little hope of Japan’s accepting recommendations under paragraph 4 and that, therefore, such recommendation would not constitute any solution either for the League or for Japan.

Madariaga immediately interjected the question of what would be the Committee’s position if it accepted these proposals and China refused.

Beneš shared this preoccupation. He also had talked with the Japanese and was constrained to recognize that the latter had made considerable progress toward meeting the Committee’s views. He was, however, very anxious on two points:

1. Because the new proposals would have a weakening effect, particularly as regards nonrecognition [and]

2. Because the phrase as to harmonizing of the Lytton Commission’s recommendations with events which have taken place would lead to extreme difficulties every time any practical question would present itself, such as withdrawal of troops.

Keller, while recognizing that the Japanese had made progress, felt that there were still very great and dangerous obscurities. In the first place these new proposals recalled Japan’s original desire for direct negotiations with China with only indirect League participation. Secondly, the phrase as to harmonization seemed to him confused and to open the way to all sorts of misunderstanding.

Eden agreed that the new proposals showed an effort on the part of the Japanese to meet the Committee’s views. He was not, however, happy regarding their significance. Several of the proposals seemed to him designed for the same purpose, namely: to avoid the full consequence of point 7 in chapter 9 of the Lytton Report. In his mind the essential question was that of the sovereignty of Manchuria. Does Japan in fact accept point 7 as it stands? He thought this question should be cleared up by the President and Secretary-General before all else. Similarly Eden wondered if in the unlikely case that the Committee should accept the other Japanese suggestions the Japanese would still maintain their right to make reservations. Finally the Committee must not forget the other party to the dispute. Koo had observed to him yesterday that if either party made a reservation to chapter 9 it would clearly demonstrate that point 7 could not be worked out in the negotiations.

Massigli raised the question of Jehol. Was there any possibility of avoiding a huge military movement? He doubted it but was interested in the new Japanese phraseology that a satisfactory regime might be evolved out of the present one without any violent change (see third sentence, first paragraph, page 130, of Lytton Report for source of this phrase).

Madariaga then drew attention to three pitfalls in the proposals:

1. What if the Committee arrived at a text accepted by Japan and refused by China? Committee must beware of being maneuvered into this dangerous situation.

2. Was it possible to continue talking of conciliation while everybody knew that a huge military movement was under way?

3. Conciliation must not begin in an ambiguity or be a clause in texts which no one understands. There should be a clear and unequivocal answer to the question of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria.

Motta felt new proposals showed a really serious Japanese effort to approach the Committee which was encouraging. Nevertheless, the real question was that Japan accept Chinese sovereignty, yes or no. A proof of good will was essential with regard to abstention from further military movements.

Drummond, replying to various questions, said he thought that the Japanese would be prepared to give up any reservations if the Committee accepted the other Japanese suggestions.

He had not felt it necessary to discuss Jehol with the Japanese delegates because certain in advance that the answer would be that they were prepared to give up further participation or movements if the Chinese would stop sending new troops into Jehol and would withdraw troops recently sent there. This obviously was very difficult for the Committee even to suggest since China had full right to send troops wherever it wanted within its own territory. As regards the sovereignty of Manchuria, he is prepared to put the question to the Japanese, but would prefer a formal letter which would avoid confusion and necessitate a formal reply.

Motta suggested that the question regarding Jehol should be put orally. The Secretary-General strongly inclined to this view and the Committee so decided. A draft letter regarding point 7 previously prepared by Drummond was then read and approved with some modifications.

Wilson