793.94 Commission/722
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 4, 1933.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Consulate’s despatch No. 428 Political, dated November 29, 1932,83 in which an attempt was made to present certain aspects of the Sino-Japanese dispute as they were [Page 452] evidenced in Geneva at that time. Particular reference was made to the positions of the various League powers which indicated a divergence in policy between the great powers and the small powers on certain of the fundamental features of the situation. From telegrams which have been addressed to the Department from Geneva during the recent series of meetings of League bodies, I feel the Department may have noted to what extent these divergent views have found expression in official statements and in official action on the part of representatives of the powers concerned.
As the Department has also been informed, the Committee of Nineteen adjourned on December 20 until a date in January and at the time of its adjournment issued a statement (Consulate’s despatch No. 455 Political, dated December 22, 193284) setting forth the reasons which governed that action. During the pause in the progress of this matter which this adjournment affords, the question naturally comes to the fore as to what will be the course of events when the Committee of Nineteen reconvenes during the first part of the coming year. That the statement to which I have just referred throws but little light on the question is, I think, evident; nor is the statement of M. Huber, Acting President of the Committee of Nineteen, which was also made on December 20 (Consulate’s despatch No. 455 Political) particularly illuminating. Everything suggests, nevertheless, that this is a period during which national policies are being considered with a view to meeting various exigencies in the matter which may arise in the near future. The factors are, however, so complex that to attempt any definite forecast as to what may transpire is quite out of the question. Nevertheless, as I have attempted to do in previous despatches on this subject, I shall give the substance of what I think may be regarded as well-informed opinion in Geneva on certain phases of the problem.
In the first place, the adjournment of the Committee of Nineteen on December 20 served two purposes. It permitted a return to their homes for the holiday season of the representatives of the various powers—which has been an unbroken custom in Geneva. It also extended in point of time the gesture of conciliation to Japan—for whatever value such action may be worth.
That “conciliation is at an end” is, however, an almost universal opinion. In this I refer to what, for want of a better phrase, I may term de facto conciliation. That some kind of a de jure conciliation may continue for some time, is entirely another matter. The position of Japan as described in the meeting of the Committee of Nineteen (Wilson’s No. 77, December 20, 6 p.m.) is now so manifest that a real [Page 453] hope of an agreement between Japan and China on the fundamental factors of the situation must, it is felt, be entirely abandoned.
With the giving over of conciliation, there likewise disappears the entire group of questions concerned with inviting the participation in Geneva of the United States and Russia. I will say in passing, however, that while the matter of such an invitation was still being considered, there were two schools of thought concerning it. One favored a “weak” resolution on which an invitation would be based—that is, weak enough for Japan to accept—and then a passing to the real conclusion of the problem with the “help” of the United States and Russia. The other favored a resolution strong enough to accord with what was held to be the position of the United States. The difficulty in this latter plan was that Japan would refuse to accept it for various reasons as well as upon the technical grounds which it was felt she could easily advance, to the effect that such a resolution would not be conciliatory in spirit, but would be rather a pre-judgment of the case.
I have also discussed this matter as having in a way to do with one angle of the present situation here. For it must be remembered that, although it would appear that from a practical point of view the whole problem has entered a new phase, technically the deliberations are still being conducted under paragraph 3 of Article 15 of the Covenant.
When the Committee of Nineteen reassembles, it will still be acting under paragraph 3. The question thus arises as to what will happen. There are two possible courses which it is seen the affair may take. First, an attempt may be made to continue as long as possible under paragraph 3—through a reluctance to face difficulties, through a reluctance completely to alienate Japan, and in a vague hope that “something might happen” to render unnecessary drastic League action. Great Britain is regarded as favoring such a course. It is scarcely necessary to say that this is probably what Japan most desires at the present juncture. Second, there may be a speedy recourse to paragraph 4 of Article 15. An examination of that paragraph will reveal that action under it requires unanimity in certain contingencies. While some difficulties may be encountered in this respect, it is generally felt that it is the action which will ultimately be taken—simply because in the present posture of affairs, unless some unforeseen and highly improbable change in the situation intervenes, such action appears to be inescapable.
I wish to state parenthetically at this point that when one turns to a consideration of paragraph 4 of Article 15, it will be found that regard must be had at the same time to all of the succeeding paragraphs of the article in question.
That recourse to paragraph 4 is being seriously considered is further lent support by the fact that I am informed privately from a [Page 454] thoroughly reliable source that Sir Eric Drummond has agreed to frame a draft resolution for proceeding to paragraph 4, this draft to be ready by January 16. Such a resolution would embody a statement of the “failure” of conciliation. In passing I may add that it does not appear to have been technically determined whether action on such a resolution falls within the competence of the Committee of Nineteen, or whether such action would have to be taken by a plenary Assembly.
Taking, however, as a hypothesis that paragraph 4 will be called into play, there of course at once arises the problem as to the form [that] action under this paragraph will take. This is seen as a new problem which the League in all probability will soon have to face and which, in such a course of events, would constitute the preoccupation of League bodies for some little period—although just how long such a phase of the affair might continue it is impossible to say. Under paragraph 4 the Council (and/or the Assembly—see paragraphs 9 and 10) must make a “report” containing a “statement of facts” and “recommendations”. Thus from a technical point of view it will be the formulation of this “report” around which the League deliberations would center. It is believed that Great Britain and perhaps some other powers will endeavor to have the report so framed as to ascribe as equal a responsibility as is possible to China and to Japan. It is held further that Great Britain will in particular endeavor to prevent the inclusion in any such report of a reference to Japan’s having broken the provisions of the Covenant and that she will do this in order to avoid possible action under paragraph 4 of Article 16. The small powers, it is believed, will favor a statement somewhat along the lines of the so-called “four-power” draft resolution of December 7 (Consulate’s telegram No. 354, December 8, 10 a.m.).
What may result from these opposing points of view must at this time be largely a matter of speculation. Some comments may, however, be made. Under the turn affairs have taken, if a “strong” resolution is presented and supported by the majority of the states, it is evident that a new aspect of the whole affair emerges. The struggle in Geneva is seen as no longer between China and Japan, or between the League and Japan, but rather as between Great Britain and the League. In other words: will Great Britain stand by the Covenant? In such an issue, I may add that it is felt that, although London will attempt various manoeuvers, the ultimate answer will be that Great Britain must stand by the League.
What Japan will do in the face of such a report naturally brings up another question, one which is usually discussed in the light of whether, or not, she will withdraw from the League. Various solutions are suggested which envisage Japan’s remaining a member of the League even in the face of a condemnatory verdict. I must say, however, that [Page 455] such solutions do not strike me as very impressive. I am inclined to believe that they are more ingenious than realistic and that the question will not be governed by diplomatic formulae, but rather by the reaction of public opinion in Japan.
In addition to a “statement of facts” it is seen that the report envisaged under paragraph 4 of Article 15 calls for “recommendations”. The term “recommendations” is a broad one and thus this mandate is seen as susceptible to two interpretations, i. e. recommendations to the parties to the dispute; recommendations to the members of the League. Just, however, as the time for conciliation seems to be past, so does the time for recommendations (to Japan), unless indeed such recommendations were accompanied by penalties for their non-fulfilment. But I believe it is evident that the application of such penalties would ultimately fall on League states, which is tantamount in the end to “recommendations” to those states.
Taking, however, the interpretation that under paragraph 4 recommendations will in some manner be made for action on the part of League states, a consideration of what these recommendations may be becomes pertinent. Those most frequently spoken of are three in number: (1) non-recognition of Manchukuo, perhaps coupled with “non-cooperation with Manchukuo” (although just what form non-cooperation might take is not clear); (2) the laying down of a munitions embargo against Japan; (3) the withdrawal of diplomatic representatives from Tokio. I may say at this point, nevertheless, that from the temper of the situation here there is a question in my mind whether any recommendations would extend much beyond (1).
I appreciate that throughout the foregoing Great Britain has been mentioned as in a special position vis-à-vis the whole problem. Whether this be actually true or not, it is, of course, difficult to say. I can simply state that it is felt to be the case in many quarters in Geneva. In this connection, it is nevertheless only proper to give consideration to the circumstance that this estimate of British policy probably emanates chiefly from the representatives of the smaller powers who see in possible British action a weakening of the League, a structure which it is the policy of a large number of the small powers to maintain. I find that various delegates appear most bitter against Great Britain, expressing themselves to the effect that “at last London will be brought to a show-down” when she will have to choose between Japan and the Covenant.
With respect to France, on the other hand, she is seen as much more likely to support the League, her continental policy being more closely bound up with its maintenance. The small powers are also feeling that they will find support in France, especially in the person of Boncour.
[Page 456]It is not anticipated at this time that Italy or Germany will assume any leadership, but that they will rather await the results of what within the circle of the large European powers means the reaching of a solution of the problem presented by the opposing policies of Great Britain and France. Should, moreover, France actively assume the leadership of the smaller powers and adopt their rather extreme position, it is not believed that Great Britain could hold out.
Although the question of the technical participation of the United States in a League body is laid aside for the moment, the actual role which the American Government may play in this entire question is of course constantly under consideration. From all that I can gather, the position of the United States in not intervening in action under the Covenant or of bringing influence to bear which would involve commitments in Geneva, is clearly understood and the reasons for such a policy are fully appreciated. It is felt, nevertheless, that British action and, although perhaps to a less extent, French action in Geneva during January hinges largely on what they individually may be able to learn respecting the desires of Washington and respecting the action of Washington in certain given contingencies. Should the League pass to paragraph 4 of Article 15, the only move (laying aside participation in an organ of conciliation) which it is seen the United States could make would be to endorse such action as may be taken under that paragraph, which, to be effective, would include adopting a policy in conformity to such recommendations as may be made. Thus Washington opinion respecting such recommendations is seen as of the highest import; and, as a corollary, it is felt that neither Great Britain nor France can act without some fore-knowledge of Washington’s attitude.
In my despatch No. 428 Political, to which I have already referred, I discussed at some length the part played by the small powers in Geneva, insofar as I could observe it at that time. This position of the small powers became more evident in the “four-power” draft resolution of December 7, to which I have likewise made reference. The powers taking the lead at that time are still in evidence in the same role. They are: Spain, Czechoslovakia, the Irish Free State, Sweden, and, to a less extent, Norway. In a question of a vote for maintaining a strong “League” position, it seems to be believed that the majority of the small powers would follow the lead of those mentioned. In particular, it is felt that Roumania and Yugoslavia would vote with Czechoslovakia. It is also the current opinion here that in general the Latin American states are opposed to any form of “military intervention”, and thus anything lending strength to this principle is regarded as likely to receive their support.
There is, as can easily be imagined, much talk here of Great Britain [Page 457] and perhaps some others of the great powers putting pressure on certain of the lesser powers to compel them to modify their policies. Many possibilities are cited in this connection and some are spoken of with considerable assurance. The Department will understand, however, that while such developments are extremely interesting, it is virtually impossible to form an opinion on them of any value here in Geneva.
The individuals who have been the leaders among the delegates of the small powers up to the present time have been: Beneš (Czechoslovakia), Madariaga (Spain), Connolly (Irish Free State), Undén (Sweden) and Lange (Norway). Among these, Beneš and Madariaga have been the most active. It has often been a question in my mind to what extent these men and also certain others who have long been known as ardent advocates of the League, really represent their respective governments, or to what extent they were simply allowed a rather free hand in regard to expressions of “theory”, which would become an entirely different matter were their governments confronted with questions of “action”. The position of these men in their respective governments, however, coupled with the long periods over which they have given utterance to certain statements without apparently encountering any check from their capitals, leads one to believe that they may in fact be fully reflecting the policy of their respective governments.
In a consideration of all these matters, the intervention of a new factor has by no means passed unnoted in Geneva. I speak of what is regarded as a rapprochement between China and Russia as suggested in their recent resumption of diplomatic relations. From news reports, it has also been officially announced that Dr. Yen, Chinese Minister at Washington, has been appointed Chinese Ambassador in Moscow. What effect this development may have, as seen from the Geneva angle, it is as yet too early to state.
Respectfully yours,