Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1932, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/4967: Telegram

The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

Shanghai, April 5, 1932—10 p.m.
[Received April 6—3:55 a.m.⁴⁷]

My April 4, 7 p.m.

1. My British colleague and I agree that perhaps the time may have come when it would help us here if our Governments could speak to the Japanese Ambassadors at London and Washington. My British colleague has wired suggesting this.

2. It has been our understanding from the beginning that the conference between Japanese and Chinese negotiators in our presence has been for the purpose of bringing about cessation of hostilities here in Shanghai and the regulation of the withdrawal of Japanese forces. Chinese forces retired on March 3d and except that they were pursued by the Japanese there has been cessation of hostilities as of that day. In the present negotiations the Japanese have from the beginning dealt with matter as a purely military question and have made negotiations difficult; (1st) because they insisted on a wide interpretation of word “hostilities”; (2d) by demanding under the article of draft B calling for designation of Chinese positions that Chinese designate positions of their forces south of Soochow Creek and on other side of Whangpoo; (3d) by refusing to give any suggestion as to the time within which the Japanese troops would be withdrawn.

3. As to the first question, implication of Japanese demands has been that they desired to include in definition of word “hostilities” all anti-Japanese activities. As to point 2, Japanese have argued that unless Chinese designate positions of their troops south of Soochow Creek and on other side of Whangpoo Japanese forces cannot be reduced as they will otherwise feel that their rear is exposed to attack from Pootung. In regard to point 3 the Japanese have all along insisted that they cannot consent to any timetable for the reduction of Japanese forces.

4. We have had 11 meetings and some 34 hours of talk. As a result of this talk we have finally gotten the Japanese to accept article 1 of draft B with the words “and every form of” inserted between the words “all” and “hostile act” but the two sides are still far apart in regard to point 2 relative to Chinese positions south of Soochow Creek and on the other side of the Whangpoo. Sir Miles and I feel that it can serve no useful purpose for the Japanese to insist upon this point. Chinese positions south of Soochow Creek are opposite the French and British sectors of the Shanghai defense perimeter; neither the British nor the French are interested in these positions as there has been no threat by the Chinese from that direction nor has there been any attack upon the Settlement nor upon the Japanese forces farther south of Whangpoo; and we are loath to support the Japanese in requesting Chinese to place their forces in that direction in the same category with those with which the Japanese forces have been in contact. The Japanese argue that unless they can include these areas among those mentioned in article 2 of draft B they will feel unable to withdraw their troops from their present positions or to reduce their number lest they become exposed in their rear. This seems to us an absurd claim unless it covers an intention on the part of the Japanese to obtain through this agreement the demilitarization of this area around Shanghai. The Chinese suspect the latter and we feel that there is reason for their suspicion and we do not wish to be involved in urging Chinese to yield on this point.

5. The Japanese state with regard to the third point that the time within which their troops can be withdrawn from this area is directly related to and contingent upon Chinese willingness to designate the positions of their forces south of Soochow Creek and on the other side of Whangpoo. This attitude on the part of the Japanese tends to confirm our suspicion that Japanese intend to use us for the purpose of obtaining demilitarized area around Shanghai or intend to hold their forces in Shanghai until Chinese are prepared to concede this point.

6. From the above it will appear that I am of the opinion that the Japanese are proving recalcitrant in the present negotiations; that they are not above attempting to use them for the purpose of attaining ends favorable to Japan.

7. I therefore wonder whether it would not be possible for you to call in the Japanese Ambassador and endeavor to persuade his Government to be more conciliatory here at Shanghai. I make this suggestion with a considerable amount of diffidence for it has been amply evident all through these strange negotiations that Shigemitsu counts for very little here although he is the representative of the Japanese Government. He defers always to the military delegates who treat all questions from a purely strategical and military angle. I feel fairly sure that the same situation prevails in Japan itself.

8. However, I am making the above suggestion for my British colleague and I are at our wits’ end. Negotiations threaten to go on indefinitely with no progress unless we can persuade the Japanese to limit their demands within the spirit of the League resolution of March 4th.

Johnson

47. Telegram in two sections.