793.94/4965: Telegram
The Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton) to the Secretary of State
133. I venture for a more complete explanation the following background to my conversation with the Prime Minister reported hereinafter, of which I had prepared a memorandum for delivery to you.
After the Prime Minister dictated the reply contained in my 129, April 2, 4 p.m.45 he expressed his very deep satisfaction that with your European visit46 he was to renew the personal consultations with you interrupted by his recent illness.…
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3. He reported the information contained in my 130, April 2, 5 p.m., to which subject I returned, after his digressions as to conditions, suitability, et cetera, as often as the conversation permitted. In substance the Prime Minister said that it was foreseen some time ago by critics of the League that members might well be actually in a state of war, without a formal declaration of war, in order to escape the penalties placed upon war by the Covenant. This was in fact what had happened in the present instance, although the Chinese had almost “put the fat in the fire”. During the last Far East discussions in Geneva the Chinese had drawn up a resolution which a League representative agreed formally to present. This resolution declared that Japan by her actions was in fact in a state of war with members of the League.
This League representative showed this resolution to Sir John Simon who said that he would have nothing to do with it and that if it were presented he would deny all knowledge of it. Eventually [Actually?] the resolution just escaped presentation, but the Prime [Page 665] Minister said this showed how near Japan had been to open conflict with members of the League. The Prime Minister continued in substance that one must realize that Japan on her part had probably considered that a situation might develop out of the Manchurian crisis where the League might invoke article 16, or that she possibly had foreseen a situation where the League might direct the use of force against Japan by members of the League. The Prime Minister continued that the British Government had reason to believe that Japan had studied such possible emergencies. At any rate he was certain that Japan had studied the advantages accruing to her in pursuing her Chinese policy should she at any time occupy by force all of China’s treaty ports.
The Prime Minister said that a Japanese Consul in Malaya had asked a British official stationed there “what would be the attitude of the British Government if Japan did extend the use of force in China”. I asked the Prime Minister why he attached importance to this possibly casual question of a Japanese Consul and he said that he felt that it was an indication that Japan was systematically seeking information in view of possible contingencies. England had interests not only in Hong Kong and the Malay Peninsula but all through the, East. The Prime Minister added, “If the Japanese did occupy Hong Kong what could we do? We could put no fleet in the Far East comparable to the strength of Japan. We have lost bases and we have stopped work dramatically [on them?]. So much for naval disarmament.”
He then intimated, but did not state in so many words, that the situation (I did not feel like asking him whether he meant within the Cabinet or internationally but gathered he unconsciously included both) was such that England must consider a review of her position under her past naval program.
The Prime Minister continued, “My whole foreign policy, as you so well know, is based on cooperation with the United States. I have informed Simon to keep in close touch with you while he is in London, and to do nothing while he is in Geneva without consulting Norman Davis and Wilson. Simon tells me that he has followed that instruction although at times he and Davis could riot agree. But England[”], continued the Prime Minister, [“]is a member of the League and must maintain her obligations for each. Fortunately I have succeeded in [the extent?] that the members of the League and the United States are now all leaning on the same fence, and I think the fence is strong enough to support us all.[”]
[Page 666][“]But,[”] asked the Prime Minister, [“]what is the position in the United States? How far are you ready to take action beyond what you, with the League, have already taken? We all have problems on our hands just now probably severe enough that we would like to avoid attitudes that might lead to actual hostilities in the Far East. The League cannot invoke article 16 without causing conflict.[“] I said I had no knowledge, personal or official, of my Government’s conception of policy in the Far East beyond the expressions already made. The Prime Minister then asked me what I personally thought. I answered that if we considered our present position vis-à-vis Japan, as made by recent declarations, as the status quo, then there were obviously a right and a left. On the liberal left lay the hope that, first, natural world economic forces; second, Japan’s desire as a proud race to stand well in the eyes of the world; and, third, the large liberal element in Japan itself (which by force of circumstances was understood to be expressionless) might be able to bring Japan back into the vindication of world sanity; on the right lay a policy of coercion made necessary by circumstances. Before adopting this we must be certain that it would accomplish its end and not merely result in intensified Japanese nationalism, entirely suppressing the Japanese liberal element and bringing economic ruin. The Prime Minister asked me if I had ever been stationed in Japan and when I said yes he said that my remarks interested him because they were identical with the observations as presented from Ambassador Lindley.
- Telegram in three sections.↩
- Not printed.↩
- See vol. i, pp. 104 ff.↩