793.94/4952: Telegram
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 2—7:40 a.m.]
Your 124, March 31, 3 p.m.
1. My British colleague and I are constantly in consultation between ourselves, and with Quo and Shigemitsu, with a view to finding some way of turning the very difficult corner which has developed in connection with article 3 draft B and annex 3. We invited Shigemitsu and Quo to have tea with us last evening and for an hour or more explored the possibilities of a compromise. British Minister and I piled with both sides to consider facts and psychology of the situation and to bear in mind that it was most important that we do not adjourn without some kind of an agreement even if agreement must be to disagree on this particular point leaving other matters to stand in a signed and agreed document. I suggested that Sir Miles draft the amendment to read “The further withdrawal of the Japanese forces to the areas mentioned in the first sentence of article number 3 will be completed as soon as possible in accordance with the spirit of the resolution of March 4th and the discussion which preceded its adoption” in order to avoid the use of the words “conditions of local security” to which the Chinese object as being so vague as to permit of too wide an interpretation. And further to omit Chinese desire for a timetable and to reduce objection to a timetable specified in the agreement I suggested that Japanese consider whether it would not be [Page 660] possible for them independently of this conference but simultaneously with signing of the agreement to issue either as orders to the Army or as a proclamation to the Japanese community at Shanghai a statement by General Shirakawa welcoming the conclusion of negotiations as an indication of return to conditions of local security announcing accomplishment of the mission of the Japanese expeditionary forces and a program for its immediate withdrawal, Shigemitsu indicated a desire to discuss this suggestion with General Shirakawa.
We met again this morning and the Department will note my April 2, 1 p.m., made considerable progress. This leaves every question settled except the very important points of (a) fixing the Chinese positions, (b) fixing the localities to which Japanese troops will be withdrawn and reaching some understanding regarding withdrawal of Japanese forces. Shigemitsu informed us that his Government was now considering the Lampson paragraph. We therefore adjourned to meet Monday.39 Both Lampson and I hope that a way will be found as both sides appear to want to find a way.
Quo told me last night that he was in a most difficult position in regard to this matter and felt that there was nothing left for him to do but resign and make a statement as he did not feel that he could assume the responsibility of signing an agreement that did not contain some definite time limit upon the retention of Japanese forces here. I urged him not to take this step until all possible courses had been explored but I feel convinced that public feeling among Chinese is such that it will be difficult for Chinese Government to support any understanding that will result in retention of Japanese forces here. Chinese public is not going to reason in regard to this matter.…
Lampson and I have as a final suggestion, which we will not make until it is evident that no other suggestion will serve, that both sides as indicated above agree to disagree on this point leaving rest of agreement stand, Chinese to sign with a statement to the effect that they will not consider agreement to have been implemented until first sentence of article 3 of draft B has been carried out.
- April 4.↩