Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1932, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/4836: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Cunningham)

Washington, March 19, 1932—2 p.m.

110. For the Minister. Department’s No. 103, March 17, 1 p.m. and your March 19, 3 p.m.

1. The question of possible assistance toward liquidating the military situation at Shanghai has been discussed in this Department’s telegram under reference. Prior to the receipt of information from you that definite steps are in progress toward that objective, officers of the Department were working on a draft of a project in reference to problems which might need to be discussed in order to insure withdrawal by the Japanese and for the regulation of the situation after their withdrawal. I now send you an outline of this project in order that you may have the benefit of and may use as your own any suggestions therein which in the course of the negotiations you may find helpful. Please understand that I do not offer this project as a formal recommendation or desideratum of the Department and that in sending you an outline thereof it is not my thought to interfere or even to suggest the adoption of any of these ideas as a formula for the solution of the problems involved at Shanghai, which can only be worked out by yourself and your colleagues who are in touch with the details of the local situation.

2. For your guidance, please also understand that my views as to the limited scope of the conference provided for in the Assembly resolution of March 4 as reported to you in my 77, March 5, 9 p.m.¹² and my 82, March 8, 6 p.m., are unchanged, and, as previously stated, I do not understand that they differ from the Assembly’s own interpretation. As pointed out in paragraph 2 of my 82, March 8, 6 p.m., I have always felt that in spite of the limited scope of this conference the question of safety and order in the evacuated areas could not be avoided. A reading of the debate in the Assembly at the time of the passage of the resolution indicates, moreover, that, although the Assembly definitely rejected the Japanese proposal that the conference should discuss “conditions” of withdrawal, they had in mind to exclude discussion of conditions in a broad or political sense but not to exclude discussion of measures really pertinent to the problem of protection of lives and property of Japanese and other foreigners. It is true that Yen made the statement quoted in your March 14, 2 p.m. regarding his interpretation of the resolution and that no other delegate commented upon it. On the other hand, the following colloquy between Sato and Hymans, the President of the Assembly, quoted from the minutes of the Assembly meeting on March 4,¹³ as transmitted to the Department, will perhaps help to clarify in your mind the meaning of the resolution:

“Sato immediately announced that he would accept paragraphs 1 and 2. With regard to paragraph 3 he proposed that the final half of that paragraph should read ‘for the conclusion of arrangements which shall render final the cessation of hostilities and regulate the conditions and the details concerning the withdrawal of the Japanese forces and the future situation of the Chinese forces’.

He emphasized that arrangements should be made to settle not only the details of Japanese withdrawal but also the conditions of that withdrawal. He considered that the reference to the future situation of the Chinese forces was in keeping with the announced Japanese policy to withdraw as soon as security is restored in Shanghai.

To this Hymans replied ‘There is a very considerable difference between the amended treaty and the text as it is before you because “conditions” implies an event by which withdrawal is conditioned. That, I gather, is the meaning of M. Sato’s amendment, but that was not the intention of those who drafted this text. We referred to the technical details of withdrawal whereas “conditions” might imply political conditions and therefore it altogether changes the meaning of the text’.

Sato responded that while Japan did not wish to hamper the present efforts it is only by taking into account all the prevailing circumstances on the spot that it will be possible to decide upon the details of withdrawal. He explained that ‘conditions’ meant the maintenance of security and protection for the lives and property of Japanese nationals.

Hymans expressed the view that there was only a slight difference between the text proposed by the Bureau and the text as amended by the Japanese in view of Sato’s explanation. He considered that conditions concerning security would naturally be provided for and included in the arrangements which are referred to in the Bureau’s draft to ‘render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces’.

Sato, after recalling that the Japanese attended this Assembly with certain reservations regarding the application of Article 15 announced that following the interpretation which the President had given of the resolution the Japanese delegation ‘can accept the text, that is to say, we raise no obstacle to its acceptance by the Assembly.’”

3. The outline of the project prepared in the Department and referred to above is as follows:

“The Chinese national authorities shall, pending a settlement of the major issues between China and Japan, give undertakings:

(a) That any person or persons subject to Chinese jurisdiction carrying on within the area of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai (including the International Settlement and the French Concession), by means of violence or by means calculated to incite violence, anti-Japanese or other anti-foreign agitation shall be prosecuted by the appropriate authorities within the areas referred to before the appropriate tribunals under the applicable provisions of the Chinese Criminal Code, particularly the applicable sections of Chapter III, Offenses Against Friendly Relations with Foreign States; Chapter VII, Offenses Against Public Order; Chapter XI, Offenses Against Public Safety; Chapter XXV, Offenses Against Personal Liberty; and Chapter XXXVI, Mischief.

(b) That if in the process of judicial decision existing provisions of Chinese law are found to be insufficient to prevent the use of violence or means calculated to incite violence in anti-Japanese or other anti-foreign agitation, the Chinese Government shall immediately promulgate adequate remedial legislation for application within the areas referred to in (a) above.

(c) That the Chinese judicial authorities administering Chinese law within the areas referred to shall be instructed to enforce strictly the provisions of the applicable laws.

(d) That no official assistance or encouragement of any sort shall be given to any violent anti-Japanese or other anti-foreign agitation within the Municipality of Greater Shanghai.

(e) That the administration of the Chinese area of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai shall be turned over completely to the Chinese civil authorities functioning within that area under the leadership of the Mayor.

(f) That no Chinese military forces whatsoever shall be brought within the area of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai except such limited number of Chinese troops as the Mayor of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai may, for some specific purpose of emergency and for a limited period, be permitted to bring into that area with the consent of the majority of the members of the Consular Body at Shanghai, provided always that if any irregular Chinese military forces not under the control of the Chinese national authorities attempt or there is reason to believe that any Chinese troops will attempt to enter the said area without the permission referred to, the Consular Body at Shanghai, in consultation with the interested Legations, the foreign defense commanders and municipal authorities at Shanghai, may upon their own initiative, after informing the Chinese national authorities if that be possible, take such steps as may be necessary to prevent such entry.

The Japanese Government shall, when the above undertakings of the Chinese national authorities have been given, give undertakings:

(a) That the Japanese military forces shall immediately be withdrawn from the Shanghai area except such number in the International Settlement and in the extra-Settlement road areas as may be necessary to enable Japan to cooperate with the other foreign defense forces at Shanghai in the protection of the Settlements.

(b) That the Chinese areas occupied by Japanese troops since January 28, 1932, shall immediately be handed over to the appropriate Chinese authorities.

(c) That the areas, of the International Settlement and its extra-Settlement roads, and-properties occupied by Japanese troops since January 28, 1932, shall be immediately handed over to the authorities of that Settlement in order that those authorities may resume their normal functions therein.”

4. You will note that certain portions of (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the above project deal with the question of violent boycott methods. I still believe that the boycott question in general is appropriate only to a conference in which Sino-Japanese relations as a whole are discussed, including Manchuria. As a practical matter, however, I realize that the subject of violent boycott demonstrations at Shanghai can with difficulty be excluded from the conference immediately proposed, and in view of the fact that violent boycott disturbances in the Municipality of Greater Shanghai might react unfavorably on the peace and order of the Settlements, there would seem to be justification for our approval of measures such as are suggested in this project (I understand that the Mayor of Greater Shanghai did, on January 28, 1932, agree to meet certain Japanese demands in regard to anti-Japanese boycott activities).

5. You will also note that the question of preventing contact between the Chinese and Japanese armies during withdrawal is not covered by this project but is covered in paragraph 3 of my telegram under reference.

6. Understand clearly that the material above is sent you purely for purposes of information, suggestion and guidance, and in no sense by way of specification or express direction as to action which you shall take. Keep in mind the principle that this Government does not desire to take and does not desire that you take any initiative toward any broadening of interpretation of the League’s Resolutions.

Carr

12. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 209.
13. For minutes of meeting of the General Commission, see League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 101, vol. i, pp. 38–43, particularly pp. 41–42.