793.94/4684a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Cunningham)
82. For the Minister. In view of the intricacies of the Shanghai situation, I have taken this occasion to attempt further to clarify to you my views and the reasons underlying them. I desire that you should feel free to comment and I look to you for constructive suggestions at all times as the occasions arise because of my personal confidence in your judgment and your intimate knowledge of the existing situation and the practical problems in which we are faced and will be facing.
- 1.
- I have given to you at some length in my 77, March 5, 9 p.m.,69 my interpretation of the resolution passed by the Assembly of the League of Nations. After reading the debates in the Assembly at the time of its passage, I believe that my strict interpretation as to the scope of the proposed conference does not differ from that of the Assembly. In other words the immediate conference proposed is a conference limited to a liquidation of the present military situation looking to a prompt withdrawal of the Japanese troops. The Assembly, in harmony with the position of the American Government, appears to have definitely taken the position that permanent concessions, either territorial or otherwise, are not to be wrung from China under the pressure of Japanese military occupation.
- 2.
- In spite of the limited scope of the conference immediately proposed there will nevertheless arise difficult problems. Because of their [Page 534] practical nature, I have informed Geneva that I agreed with the suggestion of members of the Assembly that the agenda for the conference had better be worked out by the representatives of the interested powers at Shanghai in conjunction with representatives of the Chinese and Japanese Governments and military authorities. One of the first questions to be dealt with as suggested in your March 7, 8 p.m. will be the question of the security of Japanese and other foreign nationals living within the area now occupied by Japanese troops. This is typical of the questions which will have to be worked out immediately at Shanghai by those familiar with the problems and as to which I should like your views as they develop.
- 3.
- The reason why I have felt the scope of the coming conference should be strictly limited as described in my 77, March 5, 9 p.m., is the importance of keeping absolutely clear the broad issue of treaty violation which has now crystallized in the public mind throughout the world. Present indications are that the Assembly of the League of Nations will take action in line with the suggestion contained in the letter to Senator Borah which will result in further clarification and vindication of the important principle involved. In view of these considerations, it would be most unfortunate to have this issue obscured and the position weakened by an attempt of the nations who are interested in Shanghai to take advantage of the Japanese military operations to secure further permanent concessions from China in regard to the International Settlement.
- 4.
- A strong influence will inevitably develop among foreigners in Shanghai, including Americans, to avail themselves of this opportunity to clear up long-standing grievances against the Chinese. Realizing as I do the justice of many of these complaints and the merits from a practical point of view of some of the suggestions that will be made and without any desire on my part to be inflexible, I nevertheless believe that the main principle of the conference immediately proposed must be that no concessions of a permanent character should be demanded without the consent of the Chinese Government until the military situation has been liquidated. Otherwise all nations participating in this conference will put themselves in Chinese eyes, as joint violators with Japan of the Kellogg Pact.
- 5.
- If and when the military situation at Shanghai is liquidated, it may be that a subsequent conference will be in order with a somewhat larger scope. In such a conference a more flexible attitude on the part of all participants, including the American representatives may be in order. The representatives of the Chinese Government themselves may find it practicable to make compromises in which all could acquiesce. At the present writing it is difficult to see how such a conference [Page 535] could omit consideration of the Manchurian question as one of the essential elements in the problem. At such a conference the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods might be a proper subject for discussion, particularly if the Manchurian question is part of the agenda. On the subject of the boycott, however, I would be very loath to have this Government join in any pressure on China to induce her to abandon a pacific boycott, her most effective weapon against Japanese aggression in Manchuria or elsewhere, unless the problems relating to that aggression were concurrently solved. I realize the difficulties in the boycott problem and in particular the practical difficulty of separating violent boycott measures from peaceful boycott measures and I should welcome your comments on this subject.
Our policy at Geneva will be to take no further initiative and to await action by the Assembly along the lines of the Borah letter. At the same time we are doing what we can to encourage unanimity on the strict interpretation of the Assembly’s resolution in proposal of the Shanghai conference. In a telegram to Wilson yesterday I indicated the importance of having the representatives at Shanghai of the neutral powers instructed along the lines of my instructions to you contained in my 77, March 5, 9 p.m.