793.94/3921
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
The French Ambassador sent word that he wanted to see me. He came to tell me that he had had translated the telegrams which M. Jules Henry had shown Mr. Castle and me this morning, but unfortunately he had afterwards forgotten them. He was very vehement, however, that there had been no agreement between France and Japan of the character which has been talked about in the press so nonsensically and that these telegrams show that that was so.
I then told the Ambassador what we had been doing this morning. I told him that we had received a cable from Tokyo20 of an interview [Page 167] yesterday in which the Foreign Minister had told our Ambassador, and apparently also the British and the French Ambassadors, that Japan desired our good offices in inducing the Chinese troops not to bring up further reinforcements and to withdraw the troops now in Shanghai to a safe distance to avoid clashes. I read him a portion of Forbes’ telegram in which this request was contained. I told him that acting on this the President and I had taken steps to submit to Great Britain suggested proposals for a cessation of hostilities at Shanghai along the lines on which the local authorities there were now working and also urging the two countries to at once begin negotiations in the spirit of the Pact of Paris and of the resolution of the League of December 9 in the presence of neutral observers for a settlement of all outstanding controversies between the two nations. The Ambassador expressed approval of the propositions. I told him that, in order to save time, the British were to suggest that France and Italy should make similar representations. I stressed the point, however, that we were not insisting that the French and British should follow exactly the same lines but to cover principally those two points. I urged him to telegraph at once to his Government urging them to do so. The Ambassador said he would. He specifically approved of the suggestion about the neutral observers, saying that was good, and suggesting that the best representatives would be the Ministers on the spot. The Ambassador said the situation was very serious; that Japan was mad and that he could not be sure that a revolution might not break out in Japan at any moment. He said the situation there was extremely precarious with poverty and various troubles and that, in case of a military reverse, a revolution might easily occur instantaneously. I showed him the message I had received from the Navy as to the bombardment of Nanking.21 The Ambassador threw up his hands and said “They are mad.”
- Telegram No. 31, January 31, 9 p.m., Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i p. 169.↩
- See memorandum of February 1, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 173.↩