711.94/2624
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)
Following my conversation this morning with Admiral Toyoda during which I carried out the instructions embodied in the Department’s telegram No. 562, September 4, 8 p.m.,2 I had a long conversation with the Director of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, of which the following is a summary.
The Germans and Italians are endeavoring in every way through subordinate officials in the Foreign Office and the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs to obtain knowledge of the character and progress of the conversations between the United States and Japan. Every precaution, however, is being taken to ensure secrecy despite the regrettable publicity which has been given to the Prime Minister’s letter to the President and the reports which have been circulated concerning the projected meeting between Prince Konoye and the President. During Mr. Matsuoka’s tenure of office the Director of the American Bureau was not permitted to see or to exercise any control over the instructions sent to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, but since Admiral Toyoda has become Foreign Minister this situation has been corrected. It is still true, however, that there are large numbers of Germans in Tokyo, some of whom are located in Government organizations and strategic positions, and that the German influence is consequently considerable.
The Director of the American Bureau told me that the Foreign Office, on the basis of confidential reports, had information that extremist and pro-Axis elements are plotting some form of coup on the anniversary of Japan’s adherence to the Axis on September 27, and since Admiral Toyoda will be host on that evening at a formal dinner to the diplomats of the Axis powers and will be obliged to make [Page 604] a speech, disagreeable and even dangerous incidents may take place. Mr. Terasaki voiced the opinion, as I have pointed out in previous telegrams to the Department, that to confront those opposed to an understanding with the United States with a fait accompli would be the most efficacious way to forestall their plans. The Japanese Government is apparently confident that the announcement of a fait accompli will be accorded a favorable reception by Japanese public opinion and that such concrete agreements as might be reached will be supported by the great majority of the people.
Note: The instructions contained in the Department’s telegram No. 562 mentioned in the first paragraph above directed me to inform the Foreign Minister that the American Government could not accede to the two suggestions of the Minister that we (1) suspend the sailing of American tankers to Vladivostok and (2) suspend the freezing order pending the proposed meeting of the representative heads of our two countries.
- Not printed; see note at end of this document.↩