This afternoon Prince Konoye conveyed an invitation to me to meet him in
secret tonight at a private house but subsequently he
[Page 601]
sent word that circumstances had rendered
it desirable to postpone the meeting until the following day. I believe
that the Prime Minister had wished to talk over with me the reply of the
President to his message and the oral statement made to the Japanese
Ambassador on September 3 but had on further thought deemed it advisable
for Admiral Toyoda to receive me first.
I called on the Foreign Minister late this afternoon at his request and
he asked me if I had received the text of the President’s reply to the
Prime Minister’s letter and the text of the oral communication which was
given to Admiral Nomura on September 3, to which I answered that up to
the time I left the Embassy only the third section of the telegram from
the Department of State on that subject had come in. Admiral Toyoda then
showed me the text in English of the two documents referred to above,
which had been received by the Foreign Office this morning at two
o’clock. He asked for my views concerning the divergencies of opinion
between the American and Japanese Governments which had not been brought
into conformity when the conversations in Washington were interrupted in
July. In reply I told the Minister that when the Department of State had
telegraphed me the report of the President’s conversation with the
Japanese Ambassador, my own telegram reporting our conversation
yesterday afternoon could not have been received in Washington. In view
of the fact that the Minister had stated to me his belief that his
proposal made yesterday contained the solutions to the divergence of
views which had not been solved up to the time the conversations in
Washington had been interrupted, I told him that I did not feel free to
examine with him these points until I had been informed of the reaction
of my Government to his proposal. I undertook, however, at the
Minister’s expressed and earnest request to convey to the Secretary an
expression of my hope that the opinion of my Government concerning the
proposal put forward by the Japanese Government would be sent to me at
the earliest possible moment.
[Annex]
Comment by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)99
[Tokyo, September 5,
1941.]
In my meeting tomorrow with the Foreign Minister I shall confine
myself to carrying out the explicit instructions contained in the
Department’s telegram No. 562, September 4, 8 p.m.,1 and shall avoid
[Page 602]
discussion of the
questions at issue pending a reply from the Department to my 1384,
September 4, 9 p.m.1a
Admiral Toyoda has told me that he would like to have any further
conversations which may be necessary before the proposed meeting
between the Prime Minister and the President carried on in Tokyo
rather than in Washington because, as he said, certain language
difficulties appear to have arisen in Washington. I told him,
however, that I could not make any such recommendation since I felt
that it was up to my Government to decide where and by whom such
conversations should be carried on.
After having carefully gone over the reports of the oral discussions
which took place concerning our redraft of the original proposals
advanced by the Japanese, it was apparent to me that there are four
substantial points on which no agreement has been reached, i. e.,
(1) the question of equal opportunity and non-discrimination in
China, (2) the maintenance of Japanese garrisons in China, (3) the
respective attitudes of the United States and Japan toward the war
in Europe, and (4) the question of military bases. It is pertinent
to examine whether or to what degree the commitments which the
Japanese Government is prepared to accept as set forth in points
(e), (d), (c), and (b), in that
order, of the latest Japanese proposal1b are considered by our Government as
satisfactory in regard to the four points outlined above, and
whether these new provisional commitments afford an adequate basis
for the proposed meeting between the President and the Prime
Minister.
It is obvious in this connection that no Japanese undertakings
whether oral or in written form can be accepted as giving a complete
guarantee that such undertakings can or will be carried out to our
entire satisfaction. It is clear that the first step toward a return
to the status quo ante in the Far East or the
establishment of a situation in that area which would conform to the
principles which we believe should govern decent relations between
states involves the cessation on the part of Japan of its
progressive acts of aggression. It would appear that the commitments
contained in the latest Japanese proposal, if implemented, would
fulfill this requirement. Since it is presumed that a detailed
formulation of a general plan of reconstruction of the Far East
could not probably be worked out in advance, it would be eminently
desirable that the military and economic measures of the United
States which are now inexorably pressing on Japan be relaxed point
by point pari passu with the actions of the
Japanese Government in the direction of implementing its proposed
commitments. If our Government followed this suggested
[Page 603]
course it would always
retain in its hands the leverage which would contribute to Japanese
implementation of its commitments. If an adjustment of relations is
to be achieved some risk must be run, but the risk taken in the
pursuance on our part of a course which would not only provide
inducements to the Japanese to honor their undertakings but would
also leave to the United States Government a certain leverage of
compulsion would appear to be relatively less serious than the risk
of armed conflict entailed in the progressive application of
economic sanctions which would result from a refusal to accept these
proposals.
